The Ukraine List #488

compiled by Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca)
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa
www.chairukr.com
www.danyliwseminar.com
6 October 2017

For regular postings on Ukraine and Ukrainian Studies, follow me on Twitter at @darelasn

#1
13th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada
Desmarais Hall 12102, 16-18 November 2017
http://danyliwseminar.com

The 13th Annual Danyliw Seminar (16-18 November 2017) is unveiling an ambitious program devoted to the war in Donbas, post-Maidan reforms, historical memory, the Holodomor and cutting edge research on Ukrainian society, economy and culture.

The Seminar, featuring 16 presentations, 2 book panels, 2 film screenings and 2 special roundtables, will bring together 28 scholars and doctoral students, 2 journalists and 2 filmmakers -- 25 from outside Canada (6 from Ukraine), and 17 attending for the first time, a testimony of the vibrancy of the field of Ukrainian Studies.

The program is online at https://www.danyliwseminar.com/program-2017.

Among the highlights:

- The new documentary *The Trial: The State of Russia vs Oleg Sentsov* (Estonia 2017), on the fabricated case of "terrorism" against Crimean filmmaker Sentsov. Russian filmmaker Askold Kurov will be onsite to take part in a Q&A after the screening (Thursday November 16, 4.15 pm).

- The documentary *Alisa in Warland* (Ukraine 2016), on the personal war experienced by a Ukrainian student at the Kyïv film academy. Ukrainian filmmaker Alisa Kovalenko will also be onsite to present and discuss the film (Friday November 17, 4.30 pm).

- A special panel on "Journalism and War" featuring the Ukrainian journalist Oksana Grytsenko, from Kyïv Post, and the Kyïv-based French journalist Stéphane Siohan, who reports for several international media, including Radio-Canada (Friday November 17, 2.45 pm).

- A special panel to mark the 90th anniversary of Theofil Kis, a former professor of Political Science at uOttawa who was one of the founders of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies (Friday November 17, 11.45 am).

- A panel featuring two new books on the Ukrainian economy: Oleh Havrylyshyn (formerly of the IMF) on *The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine* (Palgrave 2017) and Yulia Yurchenko (U of Greenwich, UK) on *Ukraine and the Empire of Capital: From Marketisation to Armed Conflict* (Pluto Press 2018)(Thursday November 16, 11 am).

- A panel featuring the new book by Mayhill Fowler, *Beau Monde on Empire's Edge: State and Stage in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto 2017)(Saturday November 18, 9.45 am).

- And a broad array of exciting new research: five presentation on the war in Donbas, four on post-Maidan reforms, three on historical memory, two on political economy, and two on culture.

All the Seminar sessions will be held in Room 12102 of the Desmarais Building (DMS), 55 Laurier Ave., on University of Ottawa campus. A map of University of Ottawa campus – with the DMS location – can be accesssed at http://maps.uottawa.ca.

The Seminar is open to the public and registration is free. Since space is limited, people interested in attending the seminar must register by sending an email to the Chair of Ukrainian Studies (chairukr@gmail.com) or by calling 613 562 5800, ext. 3692.

An opening reception will be held on Thursday, November 16, at 6.30 PM in Desmarais 12102, after the screening and Q&A of *The Trial*. All are cordially invited.

The Seminar will have an extensive presence on the web. All presentations and discussion sessions (Q&A) will be filmed and uploaded on the Seminar's web site (http://www.danyliwseminar.com). The Seminar papers will also be available on the website shortly after they are presented.

For real time updates, go and like the Seminar's Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/Danyliw-Seminar-874438662581143/) and follow me on Twitter at @darelasn.

The international selection committee is comprised of Dominique Arel (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa), Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France), Mayhill Fowler (Stetson U, US), Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US) and Ioulia Shukan (U Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France).

The Seminar is made possible by the commitment of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation to the pursuit of excellence in the study of contemporary Ukraine.

We look forward to seeing you at the Seminar!

Cordially,
Dominique Arel
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa

Thursday 16 November

Political Economy
9.00-9.45 AM

Moderator: Paul d'Anieri (U of California Riverside, US, paul.danieri@ucr.edu)

Mitchell Orenstein (U of Pennsylvania, US, more@sas.upenn.edu)
Polarization and Power Brokers in Ukraine and EU Eastern Partnership Countries

9.45-10.30 AM
Moderator: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, ossu57@gmail.com)

Oksana Dutchak (Kyïv Polytechnic Institute, Ukraine, ok.dutchak@gmail.com)
Next-Door Relocation: Labor Conditions and Bargaining Power in Ukrainian Done-for-Brands Garment Industry

10.30-11.00 AM
Coffee Break

11.00 AM-12.30 PM
Two New Books on the Ukrainian Economy

Moderator: Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)
Discussant: Mitchell Orenstein (U of Pennsylvania, US, more@sas.upenn.edu)

Oleh Havrylyshyn (Economist, Canada, o.havrylyshyn@utoronto.ca)
The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine:
Slow Starts, False Starts, and a Last Chance? (Palgrave, 2017)

Yulia Yurchenko (U of Greenwich, UK, y.yurchenko@greenwich.ac.uk)
Ukraine and the Empire of Capital:
From Marketisation to Armed Conflict (Pluto Press, 2017)

12.30-1.30 PM
Lunch Break

The Voluntary Battalions
1.30-3.00 PM

Moderator: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com)

Montana Hunter (King's College, UK, montanablu@gmail.com)
Crowdsourcing the Voluntary Battalions, 2014-2015

Tor Bukkvoll (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, tor.bukkvoll@ffi.no)
States and Pro-Government Militias: The Case of the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions

The Far Right on Maidan
3.00-3.45 PM

Moderator: Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Volodymyr Ishchenko (Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Ukraine, jerzy.wolf@gmail.com)
The Positive and Negative Effects of the Radical Nationalists in the Maidan Protests

3.45-4.15 PM
Coffee break

The Illusion of Terrorism in Crimea

4.15-5.30 PM
Film Screening—*The Trial: The State of Russia vs Oleg Sentsov* (Poland, 2017, directed by Askold Kurov)

On the show trial of Crimean filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, accused of "terrorism" and sentenced to 20 years in a Siberian prison.

5.30-6.30 PM
Post-Screening Q&A

Moderators: Mayhill Fowler (Stetson U, US, mfowler@stetson.edu) and Ioulia Shukan (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

Filmmaker: Askold Kurov (Russia, askold.kurov@gmail.com)

Friday 17 November

Memory Wars
9.00-9,45 AM

Moderator: Mayhill Fowler (Stetson U, US, mfowler@stetson.edu)

Marta Havryshko (Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Lviv, Ukraine, havryshko@gmail.com)
Overcoming Silence: Men, Women and Violence in the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground

9.45-10.30 AM

Moderator: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, ossu57@gmail.com)

Diána Vonnák (Max Planck Institute, Halle, Germany, vonnak@eth.mpg.de)
Unlikely Alliances: Orthodox Jews and Ukrainian Nationalism against a Holocaust Memorial in Lviv

10.30-11.00 AM
Coffee Break

11.00-11.45 AM

Moderator: Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Daria Mattingly (U of Cambridge, UK, dm628@cam.ac.uk)
Discrepancy of Portrayal of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Cultural Memory

Homage to Theofil Kis for his 90th Birthday
11.45 AM-12.15 PM

Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)
Iryna Makaryk (U of Ottawa, Canada, makaryk@uottawa.ca)

Theofil Kis, born in Ukraine and a retired professor of political science is one of the founders of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies.

12.15-1.15 PM
Lunch Break

The Insurgents
1.15-2.45 PM

Moderator: Paul d'Anieri (U of California Riverside, US, paul.danieri@ucr.edu)
Discussant: Ioulia Shukan (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

Oleksandr Melnyk (U of Alberta, Canada, alex.melnyk@utoronto.ca)
Decentralized Insurrection and Charismatic Warlordism

Natalia Savelyeva (U of Tyumen, Russia, natasha-saveleva@yandex.ru)
Getting Involved: Motives, Identities, and Narratives of Mobilization of Pro-Russian Combatants in Eastern Ukraine

Journalism and War
2.45-4.00 PM

Moderators: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com) and Ioulia Shukan (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

Speakers: Stéphane Siohan (Freelance Journalist, Kyïv, Ukraine, stephane.siohan@gmail.com) and Oksana Grytsenko (Kyiv Post, Ukraine, grytsenko.o.o@gmail.com)

4.00-4.30 PM
Coffee Break

The War in Donbas Up Close and Personal
4.30-5.45 PM
Film Screening—*Alisa in Warland* (Ukraine, 2016, directed by Alisa Kovalenko)

Alisa is a 26-year-old student at the film academy in Kyiv. She witnesses the Maidan demonstrations and embarks on a trip through Ukraine in an attempt to understand the war.

5.45-6.45 PM
Post-Screening Q&A

Moderators: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com) and Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, ossu57@gmail.com)

Filmmaker: Alisa Kovalenko (Kyïv, Ukraine, alisafrom@gmail.com)

Saturday 18 November

Arts and Politics
9.00-9.45 AM

Moderator: Mayhill Fowler (Stetson U, US, mfowler@stetson.edu)

Maria Sonevytsky (Bard College, US, maria.sonevytsky@gmail.com)
Wild Music: Ethnic Intimacy, Auto-Exoticism, and Infrastructural Activism

9.45-10.45 AM
Book Panel

Moderator: Anna Colin Lebedev (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com)
Discussant: Blair Ruble (Woodrow Wilson Center, US, blair.ruble@wilsoncenter.org)

Mayhill Fowler (Stetson U, US, mfowler@stetson.edu)
Beau Monde on Empire's Edge: State and Stage in Soviet Ukraine (U of Toronto Press, 2017)

10.45-11.15 AM

Coffee Break

Lenin and Ukraine
11.15 AM-12.00 PM

Moderator: Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)

Anna Kutkina (U of Helsinki, Finland, anna.kutkina@gmail.com)
The Fall of the Lenin Statues: Grassroots Narratives of Post-Maidan Ukraine

12.00 PM-1.00 PM
Lunch Break

Post-Maidan Reforms
1.00-1.45 PM

The Beyond the Euromaidan Book Project

Moderators: Henry Hale (George Washington U, hhale@gwu.edu) and Paul d'Anieri (U of California Riverside, US, paul.danieri@ucr.edu)

Daniel Beers (James Madison U, beersdj@jmu.edu) and Maria Popova (McGill U, Canada, maria.popova@mcgill.ca)
Judicial Reform after the Euromaidan: The More Things Change...

1.45-2.30PM
Center-Periphery

Moderator: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, ossu57@gmail.com)

Anthony Levitas (Brown U, US, anthony_levitas@brown.edu)
"Decentralization" and Local Government Reforms since Maidan

2.30-2.45 PM
Coffee Break

2.45-4.15 PM
Post-Maidan Survey Research

Moderator: Paul d'Anieri (U of California Riverside, US, paul.danieri@ucr.edu)
Discussant: Natalka Patsiurko (Statistics Canada, natalka.patsiurko@concordia.ca)

Henry Hale (George Washington U, hhale@gwu.edu)
Who Supports Radical Reforms in Ukraine?
Choosing among Alternative National Trajectories at Critical Junctures

Inna Volosevych (GfK Ukraine, Kyïv, inna.volosevych@gfk.com)
Political Views in Non-Government-Controlled Areas of Ukraine

#2
ASN 2018 Call for Papers

23rd Annual World Convention of the
Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN)

International Affairs Building,
Columbia University, NY
Sponsored by the Harriman Institute
3-5 May 2018
https://www.asnconvention.com/proposal-information

*****Proposal deadline: 26 October 2017*****

Contact information:
Proposals must be submitted to:
darel@uottawa.ca *and* darelasn2018@gmail.com

Over 150 PANELS in nine sections:
Nationalism Studies
Migration & Diasporas
Balkans
Russia
Ukraine (and Belarus)
Central Europe (including Baltics & Moldova)
Eurasia (including Central Asia & China)
Caucasus (North and South)
Turkey and Greece (and Cyprus)

THEMATIC Panels on
The Rise of the Far Right in Europe and America
The Politics of Refugees (and IDPs)
The Political Use of Historical Memory
Political Violence (Insurgency, Terrorism, War)
The Conflict in Ukraine
The Limits of Democracy in the Balkans
Turkey Since the Failed Putsch

ASN DOCUMENTARY FILM SECTION (NEW WORLD DOCUMENTARIES)

ASN BOOK PANELS (SPECIAL PANELS ON NEW ACADEMIC BOOKS)

ASN AWARDS (BEST DOCTORAL PAPERS, BEST BOOK, BEST DOCUMENTARY, BEST NATIONALITIES PAPERS ARTICLE)

The ASN World Convention, the largest international and inter-disciplinary scholarly gathering of its kind, welcomes proposals on a wide range of topics related to nationalism, ethnicity, ethnic conflict and national identity in regional sections on the Balkans, Central Europe, Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, the Caucasus, and Turkey/Greece, as well as thematic sections on Nationalism Studies and Migration/Diasporas. Disciplines represented include political science, history, anthropology, sociology, international studies, security studies, geopolitics, area studies, economics, geography, sociolinguistics, literature, psychology, and related fields.

The Convention is also inviting paper, panel, roundtable, book, documentary, or special presentation proposals related to:

- "The Rise of the Far Right," on migration, multiculturalism, populism, nativism and counter-mobilization in Eastern/Western Europe and America,
- "The Politics of Refugees (and IDPs)," on the refugee crisis in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere, securitization of borders, human and civil rights;
- "The Political Use of Historical Memory," on the construction and contestation of the memory of historical events in sites, symbols, state and (social) media narratives, and academic research;
- "Political Violence," on riots, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, civil wars, genocide, terrorism, post-conflict settlement; transitional justice and international tribunals
- "The Conflict in Ukraine," on the domestic, regional and international crisis unleashed by Maidan, the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the role of Russia, Europe and the United States;
- The Limits of Democracy in the Balkans,"on the rise of new authoritarian elites, populism, the success and failure of EU and NATO conditionality and the paradigm shift from liberalisation to stability;
- "Turkey Since the Failed Putsch," authoritarianism and the suppression of dissent, the Kurdish question, Gulenism, the army and the state, refugees, the war in Syria, relations with Russia;

Prospective applicants can get a sense of the large thematic scope of ASN Convention papers and presentations by looking at the 2017 Final Program.

Popular topics have also included language politics, religion and politics, EU integration/exit, nation-building, energy politics, and civil society.

Best Doctoral Student Papers

The ASN Convention acknowledges excellence in graduate studies research by offering Awards for Best Doctoral Student Papers. For the ASN 2017 doctoral student awards, please click here or here.

Doctoral student applicants whose proposals are accepted for the 2018 Convention, who will not have defended their dissertation by 15 November 2017, and whose papers are delivered by the deadline, will automatically be considered for the awards (unless their paper is co-authored with someone not eligible for the doctoral prize). Each award comes with a certificate and a cash prize.

ASN Book, Article and Film Awards

The Harriman ASN Rothschild Book Prize for 2017 went to Max Bergholz for *Violence as a Generative Force: Identity, Nationalism, and Memory in a Balkan Village* (Cornell University Press, 2016), a searing, original, and morally engaged study of violence in southeastern Europe during the Second World War. An honorable mention was given to Rebecca Gould for *Writers and Rebels: The Literature of Insurgency in the Caucasus* (Yale University Press, 2016).

The Book Prize award comes with a certificate and a cash prize. For information on how to have a book considered for the ASN 2018 Convention Book Prize, please click here or contact Dmitry Gorenburg at asnbookprize@gmail.com.
To view past ASN Rothschild Book Prize recipients, click here.

The ASN Huttenbach Prize for Best Article in Nationalities Papers in 2017 was given to Mohira Suyarkulova for "Fashioning the Nation: Gender and Politics of Dress in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan," which appeared in the Vol. 44. No. 2 (2016) issue of the journal. For information, contact Nationalities Papers Editor at prutland@wesleyan.edu.

The ASN Documentary Award for 2017 went to *Liberation: The User's Guide* (France/Russia, 2016), from director Alexander Kuznetsov, a striking vérité documentary that follows the long struggle of two inmates at a mental hospital. Special mentions were given to *The Unforgiven* (Finland, 2017) and *The Trial: The State of Russia vs. Oleg Sentsov* (Estonia, 2017). You can find more information about the ASN 2017 films here. The Convention is also inviting submissions for its ASN Documentary Section on new documentaries produced between 2016-2018. The documentaries are screened during regular panel slots and followed by a Q&A.

ASN Proposal Submission Information

The ASN 2018 Convention invites proposals for papers, panels, roundtables, books or documentaries:

- A paper proposal can have one or multiple authors. Only authors presenting at the Convention will have their names listed on the program;
- A panel proposal includes a chair, three or four presentations based on written papers, and a discussant;
- A roundtable proposal includes a chair and four presentations not based on written papers;
- A book panel proposal includes a chair, the book author and three discussants. If the book has two authors, who will both present at the Convention, then are two discussants;
- A documentary proposal includes the film director and a scholar who will lead the discussion after the screening (the scholar can be selected by the Convention).
- For a chair* or discussant proposal**, see below.

*A chair presents the speakers, keeps time during presentations and leads the discussion.
**A discussant reads all the papers and offers comments on them in a single intervention.

In order to be considered, all proposals, for any of the five categories listed above, must include:

- The title of the presentation (in the case of a panel or a roundtable, the title of the panel and the titles of each presentation; for a book panel or documentary, the title of the book or documentary)
- A 500 word abstract of each presentation (a single one for a paper proposal, book panel or documentary; three or four for a panel proposal; four for a roundtable)
- A 100 word biographical statement, written as a narrative within a single paragraph, for each participant in the proposals. In the case of co-authors, a biographical statement is only necessary for applicants intending to attend the Convention.
- A filled out Factsheet that can be accessed here. Please note, every submission and every participant requires a Factsheet (you may need to fill out more than one should you be part of more than one proposal). Please indicate at the end of their proposal that all applicants within the proposal have filled out a Fact Sheet.

We also welcome proposals from those who wish to only be considered as chair or discussant on a panel that the Convention will create from individual paper proposals. A chair or discussant proposal includes a 100 word biographical statement and a short paragraph indicating the areas of expertise of the applicant and a filled out factsheet which can be found here.

This information must be included in a SINGLE Word document that will be attached to an email sent to both darel@uottawa.ca AND darelasn2018@gmail.com.

IMPORTANT: Please do not send several attachments – just one, containing all three items enumerated above. And please do not use a PDF format, or any other format other than Word.

Applicants can only apply for one Paper Proposal (Individual or part of a Panel). However, should you wish to be apply to be part of a Panel, Roundtable or Book Panel not presenting a paper, you may do so, to a maximum of 2 applications.

Book panels must be based on books published between September 2016 and sometime in 2018. The organizer of a Book Panel might, but is not required to, be the book's author.

Documentaries must include a secure steaming link (such as Vimeo), for pre-screening purposes. The Convention prioritizes films longer than 50 minutes.

The receipt of all proposals will be acknowledged electronically, with some delay during deadline week, due to the high volume of proposals.

An international Program Committee is entrusted with the selection of proposals. Most applicants will be notified between January and February 2018.
Information regarding registration costs and other logistical questions will be communicated afterwards (February-March 2018).

IMPORTANT: Participants are responsible for covering all travel and accommodation costs. *Unfortunately, ASN has no funding available for panelists*.

Other Useful Information

The full list of panels from *last year's (2017) Convention* here.
The programs from past conventions, going back to 2001, are also available online here.

Publishers and companies wishing to exhibit at the Convention or advertise in the Convention Program can contact ASN Executive Director Ryan Kreider at rk2780@columbia.edu.

To follow us on Facebook, go to https://www.facebook.com/Nationalities.
To follow us on Twitter, go to @asn_org.

We very much look forward to receiving your proposal!

Dominique Arel, ASN Convention Director
Agathe Manikowski, ASN Convention Assistant Director
Lisa Koriouchkina, ASN Communications Director
Ceren Belge, Evgeny Finkel, Harris Mylonas, Program Committee Associate Directors
On behalf of the ASN Convention Program Committee

Deadline for proposals: 26 October 2017 (to be sent to both darel@uottawa.ca AND darelasn2018@gmail.com, with a single attachment).

For practical questions on the Convention, please contact the ASN headquarters:

Ryan Kreider
ASN Executive Director
Assistant Director, The Harriman Institute
Columbia University
420 W. 118th St., Room 1218, MC 3345
New York, NY 10027
212 851 2174 tel
212 666 3481 fax
rk2780@columbia.edu

#3
Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa
Application Deadline: 1 February 2018 (International & Canadian Students)
https://www.chairukr.com/kule-doctoral-scholarships

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, the only research unit outside of Ukraine predominantly devoted to the study of contemporary Ukraine, is announcing a new competition of the Drs. Peter and Doris Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Contemporary Ukraine. The Scholarships will consist of an annual award of $22,000, with all tuition waived, for four years (with the possibility of adding a fifth year).

The Scholarships were made possible by a generous donation of $500,000 by the Kule family, matched by the University of Ottawa. Drs. Peter and Doris Kule, from Edmonton, have endowed several chairs and research centres in Canada, and their exceptional contributions to education, predominantly in Ukrainian Studies, has recently been celebrated in the book Champions of Philanthrophy: Peter and Doris Kule and their Endowments.

Students with a primary interest in contemporary Ukraine applying to, or enrolled in, a doctoral program at the University of Ottawa in political science, sociology and anthropology, or in fields related with the research interests of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, can apply for a Scholarship. The competition is open to international and Canadian students.

The application for the Kule Scholarship must include a 1000 word research proposal, two letters of recommendation (sent separately by the referees), and a CV and be mailed to Dominique Arel, School of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences Building, Room, 7067, University of Ottawa, 120 University St., Ottawa ON K1N 6N5, Canada.

Applications will be considered only after the applicant has completed an application to the relevant doctoral program at the University of Ottawa. Consideration of applications will begin on **1 February 2018** and will continue until the award is announced.
The University of Ottawa is a bilingual university and applicants must have a certain oral and reading command of French. Specific requirements vary across departments.

Students interested in applying for the Scholarships beginning in the academic year 2017-2018 are invited to contact Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca), Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, and visit our web site www.chairukr.com.

#4

Award-Winning Documentary "Recovery Room" Holds Screenings

Ukrainian Weekly, 14 August 2017
http://bit.ly/2fI6tBk

MONTREAL – The award-winning feature documentary film "Recovery Room" directed by Adriana Luhova is now being screened across Canada and in the United States. The film tells the story of the impact of the current war in eastern Ukraine and the diaspora's response on a humanitarian level. It shows the courage and sacrifice of the young Ukrainian soldiers defending their eastern territory against Russian aggression.
The documentary is under the patronage of the Ukrainian World Congress.

A highly successful Montreal screening was organized by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC), Montreal branch, at the Ukrainian Youth Center on June 15, with over 150 people in attendance, including special guests from Montreal's ethnocultural communities.

Opening remarks were given by Orest Humenny, master of ceremonies for the evening. He congratulated the film's director and her team in bringing public awareness to the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine in a "powerful, sensitively constructed and moving documentary."

He then introduced Ms. Luhova, who spoke about how she began photographing the humanitarian medical missions in Ukraine organized by the Canada Ukraine Foundation (CUF), and then filming the documentary in Kyiv. She related some of the difficulties in doing the project. She also shared the emotional effect on her in filming the traumatic stories of the wounded Ukrainian soldiers, and in filming the interviews with the Canadian and Ukrainian medical teams who performed reconstructive surgery on the soldiers injured by sniper fire and explosions.

An exhibit of 60 large-scale photographs taken by Ms. Luhova during the medical missions was on display.

Ms. Luhova thanked the Montreal community for its encouragement and support, especially Caisse Populaire Desjardins Ukrainienne de Montréal; Ukrainian Catholic Women's League of Canada, Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish; Ukrainian National Federation, Montreal branch; Ukrainian Youth Association, Montreal; and others.

Following the filmmaker's remarks, Yurij Luhovy, the documentary's co-producer and editor, talked about the almost two years it took to make the film. He mentioned how proud he was to work with his daughter and how pleased he was that she asked him to edit the film. Mr. Luhovy commented on how he was also emotionally affected by the film footage during his research for stock shots, during editing – while watching and re-watching the war footage – and by listening to the soldiers' personal thoughts about the war and its traumatic impact on them.

When the film ended, silence filled the auditorium. The visibly moved audience then erupted into prolonged applause.

Following the ovation, the production team was invited to the front. It included the director Ms. Luhova, producers Mr. Luhovy and Zorianna Hrycenko, and film script editor Oksana Rozumna.

Eugene Czolij, president of the Ukrainian World Congress, acknowledged the dedication and commitment of the film's production team in capturing the story of the young defenders in eastern Ukraine. He emphasized the timeliness of the documentary and encouraged others "to view and support this moving film."

Flowers were presented and congratulations extended on behalf of the UCC Montreal to Ms. Luhova by UCC Cultural Chair Bohdanna Hawryluk.

A wine and cheese reception followed, courtesy of UNF Montreal, with viewers lingering at length, talking to the film team and entering their comments in the guest books. "Recovery Room" was shown in Halifax at Mount St. Vincent University, on May 6, organized by the Ukrainian Canadian Association (UCA) of Halifax-Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, whose president is John Zareski; and in Sydney, Nova Scotia, on May 7, at the Holy Ghost Ukrainian Catholic Parish Hall, organized by Father Roman Dusanowskyj. The documentary's producer and editor, Mr. Luhovy, was in attendance at both showings.

The documentary was also screened in Toronto to a standing ovation at the national conventions of the League of Ukrainian Canadians and the League of Ukrainian Women, on April 28, with the director and producers Mr. Luhovy and Ms. Hrycenko present. Attending this special screening in Toronto were delegates from across Canada, as well as members of the Canadian volunteer medical missions to Ukraine.

Following the screening, Ms. Luhova thanked Dr. Oleh Romanyshyn, Dr. Orest Steciw and the BCU Foundation for supporting the documentary project. She also acknowledged

Victor Hetmanczuk, president of CUF, who organized the medical missions, and Dr. Oleh Antonyshyn, who headed the missions.

Screenings of the documentary are being scheduled in Oakville, Sudbury and Ottawa, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; and Buffalo, N.Y.

For further information, to help support the film or organize a screening, readers may contact mmlinc@hotmail.com, see www.recoveryroomthemovie.com or call 514-481-5871.

The trailer for the film may be viewed at http://bit.ly/2vYn7TI.

#5

New Issue of East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies

I am pleased to announce that East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies has just published its latest issue athttps://www.ewjus.com/index.php/ewjus.

We invite you to review the Table of Contents:
https://www.ewjus.com/index.php/ewjus/issue/view/12/showToc

Vol 4, no 2 (2017) features a special thematic section “Banning a Language ‘That Does Not Exist’: The Valuev Directive of 1863 and the History of the Ukrainian Language,” guest edited by Michael Moser (University of Vienna).

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Svitlana (Lana) Krys
Editor-in-Chief
EWJUS

#6
The Center for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES)

at the University of Toronto is pleased to announce Dr. Daniel Fedorowycz as the recipient of the 2017-2018 Petro Jacyk Post-Doctoral Fellowship
http://bit.ly/2yKWZcN

Dr. Daniel Fedorowycz holds a DPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford. He researches questions relating to the causes of ethnic conflict, with a particular emphasis on Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Adopting a mixed methods and interdisciplinary approach, Daniel's dissertation examined ethnic politics in multinational states, using interwar Poland as a case study. In 2014-15, Daniel was a pre-doctoral fellow at Yale University's Program on Order, Conflict, and Violence, and in 2017 he was a Shklar Research Fellow at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Prior to his studies at Oxford, Daniel worked on projects at the NATO Information and Documentation Centre and the National Democratic Institute in Kyiv, Ukraine, as well as the Canadian Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands. Daniel received his MA in European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies and BA (Hons) from the University of Toronto.

#7
Introducing the 2017-2018 HURI Research Fellows

Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
28 August 2017
http://bit.ly/2xyodDI

Contact: Kristina Conroy, Communications Manager, kconroy@fas.harvard.edu

Mikhail Akulov
Fall Semester; The Jaroslaw and Nadia Mihaychuk Postdoctoral Research Fellow

"Between Revolution and Reaction: History of Skoropadsky's Ukraine"
Born in the Kazakh Soviet Republic, Mikhail Akulov moved to the United States and obtained a B.A. degree in History and Economics from Dartmouth College (2005) and then a Ph.D. in History from Harvard University (2013). After completing his education, he returned to Kazakhstan to assume responsibility for the General Education Department at the Kazakh-British Technical University (KBTU), where he aims to help develop a modern educational system - one attuned to the needs of both the local society and the global community at large.

As a HURI Fellow, Akulov intends to produce a history of the Ukrainian Hetmanate under Pavlo Skoropadsky in 1918. Departing from the conventional view that reduces the state to

a wartime creation of Germany, he plans to show it in light of subsequent developments, namely as one of the prefigurations of the anti-Bolshevik far-right regimes which sprang up in interwar Europe.

Polina Barskova
Spring Semester; Ukrainian Studies Fund Research Fellow
"Ukrainian Poetry in Time of Crisis"

Polina Barskova is a Saint Petersburg-born poet, prose writer, and scholar who teaches Russian Literature at Hampshire College. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkley. Her published works include ten collections of poems in Russian, three collections in English translation, and a collection of short stories in Russian, The Living Pictures (2014), for which she was awarded the Andrey Bely Prize (2015).
Her current project explores developments in Ukrainian poetry after the upheaval of the 2014 Euromaidan and during the Russo-Ukrainian "hybrid war" in Donbas. Arguing that the realm of poetical expression is where Ukrainian literary identity is being shaped today, she suggests looking at the field of contemporary Ukrainian poetry as a "rhetorical laboratory where new forms of political expression are being worked out."

As part of her effort to understand what is happening in Ukrainian poetry today, Barskova will trace the trajectories of international and inter-linguistic influence aesthetically, ideologically, and linguistically. She will also explore which institutions support this momentum of literary intensity—such as publishing houses, festivals, and social media—and the dialogue taking place through translation.

Paul D'Anieri
Fall Semester; The Eugene and Daymel Shklar Research Fellow

"From 'Civilized Divorce' to Uncivil War: Russia, Ukraine, and the West, 1991-2017"

Paul D'Anieri is a Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Riverside, also having served as the university's Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor from 2014 to 2017. His research focuses on politics and foreign policy in post-Soviet states, with an emphasis on Ukraine. His books include The Contest for Social Mobilization in Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design (M.E. Sharpe, 2007), and a textbook, International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs, currently in its fourth edition. D'Anieri received his BA from Michigan State University (1986) and his Ph.D. from Cornell University (1991).

At HURI, D'Anieri will work on his current project, a book exploring Ukraine's relations with Russia and the West from 1991 to 2017, focusing on why and how Russia came to invade Ukraine in 2014. "The book will show that, while violence was never inevitable, conflict over Ukraine's status emerged with the breakup of the Soviet Union and never

fully receded," he said. "Early work on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has focused largely on assigning blame, tending therefore toward advocacy and oversimplification rather than analysis and nuance. The work will be theoretically informed by the political literature on conflict, but will proceed chronologically." This scholarly analysis of Ukraine's first 25 years of independence should serves as an unbiased resource for today's students, journalists, and scholars.

Oleh Kotsyuba
Fall Semester; The Jaroslaw and Nadia Mihaychuk Postdoctoral Research Fellow
"A Quiet Revolution: Ukrainian Poets in Search of an Alternative Reference Frame"

Oleh Kotsyuba holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University in Slavic Languages and Literatures, as well as a "Degree of a Specialist" in German Language and Literature from the National Pedagogical University of Ternopil, Ukraine, an M.A. in English from Wayne State University (Detroit, MI), and an M.A. in Comparative Literature, Computational Linguistics, and Computer Science from Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich, Germany. He is currently a College Fellow and Lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard and Chief Online Editor of Krytyka, an independent Ukrainian intellectual journal (www.krytyka.com).

Kotsyuba will examine the strategies Ukrainian writers employed in the late 1960s and 1970s to deal with the Soviet state and omit it from their work and everyday life to the greatest possible extent. Discussing the life and works of writers such as Vasyl' Stus, Mykola Vorobiov, Ivan Semenenko, and Hryhorii Chubai, Kotsyuba's book-length study will illuminate the political and cultural transformations in the late Soviet Union, showing how "revolution" can occur through a gradual replacement of the cultural foundation on which a political regime is built. Such an understanding of revolution might provide clues into the different trajectories of Ukraine and Russia since 1991.

Igor Torbakov
Fall Semester; Ukrainian Studies Fund Research Fellow

"Symbolic Geographies of Empire: The Ukrainian Factor in Russia-Europe Relations"
A trained historian, Igor Torbakov specializes in Russian and Eurasian history and politics. He is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University and an Associate Senior Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. He has been a research scholar and visiting fellow at numerous academic institutions in Europe and the United States. Torbakov holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. His recent publications discuss the history of Russian nationalism, Russian-Ukrainian relations, the links between Russia's domestic politics and foreign policy, Russia's and Turkey's geopolitical discourses, and the politics of history and memory wars in Eastern Europe.

For his research at HURI, Torbakov poses a two-part question: 1) how the differing, imperial-like natures of Russia and the European Union (coupled with political imagination of their respective elites) make it hard for them to find an accommodation in their shared—and contested—neighborhood; 2) how the recent EU-Russia dynamics prompted Moscow policy elite to re-conceptualize Russia as a distinct civilization, apart from Europe.

While exploring these issues, the project will maintain a special focus on Ukraine, whose role in the Russia-Europe relationship has historically been and continues to be pivotal. Torbakov's contribution of a deeper historical contextualization of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, Russia's rift with Europe, and the reasons behind the Russo-Ukrainian war, will add perspective to existing works focused mainly on contemporary factors.

Nataliia Levchuk
Spring Semester; HURI MAPA Project Research Fellow

"Explaining Regional Distribution of 1933 Holodomor Losses in Ukraine: Patterns and Possible Determinants"
Nataliia Levchuk is a Senior Researcher at the Ptoukha Institute of Demography and Social Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. She received her PhD in Demography from the Institute of Economics and the Institute of Demography and Social Studies. During 2008-2010 she was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the International Max Planck Research School for Demography in Rostock, Germany, and in 2012-2013 she was a Visiting Fellow at HURI, working on The Great Famine project.

This year, Levchuk will continue her contribution to scholarship on the Holodomor and the MAPA: Digital Atlas of Ukraine program. Her current project will explore the factors accounting for variations in excess deaths, an aspect of the famine that has been less systematically explored than others. Levchuk will define possible determinants of these regional differences and measure the influence of these variables on mortality patterns in rural areas. By collecting socioeconomic and contextual indicators at the oblast and raion level and then completing a statistical analysis of the data, Levchuk intends to connect the historical record of the Holodomor with estimates of population losses at the raion level. This project may also help clarify and enhance the existing hypotheses on the famine's regional variation in losses.

Natalia Zajac
Spring Semester; The Eugene and Daymel Shklar Research Fellow

"Forgotten Female Rulers of Medieval Europe: Reconstructing the Reigns of Ten Early Rus' Queens, Noblewomen, and Princesses, 1000-1250"
Natalia Zajac recently completed her PhD at the Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto, with a dissertation entitled, "Women Between West and East: The Inter-Rite Marriages of the Kyivan Rus' Dynasty, ca. 1000-1204." Her research examines the frequent

marriage alliances formed between the Orthodox Riurikid dynasty and Latin Christian (Catholic) rulers. Her publications include a study of the reign of Queen Anna Yaroslavna, the wife of King Henri I of France, (published in 2016) and a critical re-examination how consanguinity regulations influenced the frequency of Orthodox-Catholic intermarriage in Rus' (published in 2016). Zajac is also a published poet and serves as the newsletter editor for the Early Slavic Studies Association (ESSA).

At HURI, Zajac will expand upon her previous research to examine the cultural patronage and political activities of Rus'-born princesses who became Western medieval queens, duchesses, and noblewomen and, vice versa, of Western brides who came to Rus' to marry into the Riurikid dynasty. Exploring the history of religious-cultural contacts between Kyivan Rus' and Western Europe, Zajac seeks to illuminate the connection and tensions between Roman Catholicism and Byzantine Orthodoxy. By following the inter-religious dynastic marriages linking Kyivan Rus' and Western Europe, she will challenge the notion that Western Europe and Ukraine can be separated along Catholic/Orthodox lines, while also contributing to a re-examination of women's influence in medieval societies.

#8

UN Releases Scathing Report On Russian Abuses In Occupied Crimea

by Jack Evans
Kyiv Post, 27 September 2017

Russia has come in for some of the harshest criticism yet for its invasion and illegal occupation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea with the release on Sept. 25 of a damning UN report on the human rights situation on the peninsula.

The report, by the United Nations Humans Rights Office, accuses Russia and Crimean militia groups of committing "multiple and grave violations," including "arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, ill-treatment and torture, and at least By Jack Evans. (FILE) Russian forces pose as they block the Ukrainian unit in Perevalnoye, not far from Simferopol, on March 5, 2014. one extra-judicial execution."

It also documents persecution of Crimean Tatars, the deprivation of citizenship rights and restrictions on freedom of expression, and accuses Russia of breaching the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of populations in occupied territories.

Twenty recommendations are made to Russia in the report, including that it "ensure independent and impartial administration of justice," "end the practice of extracting confessions of guilt from persons in detention through threats, torture, or ill-treatment," "stop applying legislation on extremism, terrorism and separatism to criminalize free speech and peaceful conduct," and "release all persons arrested and charged for expressing dissenting views, including regarding the status of Crimea."

However, the report also makes six recommendations to Ukraine, including that it investigate human rights violations arising from the "civil blockade" of Crimea, not to unnecessarily restrict movement to and from Crimea, and to work with Russia to transfer Ukrainian prisoners held in Crimea to Ukrainian jails.

Russian Federation representatives and Crimean authorities denounced the UN report as biased and lacking in validity, given the human rights monitoring mission's lack of access to Crimea.

Detailing the methodology of the report, the UN wrote that the Russian Federation had not responded to its request to admit observers to the territory. As a result, the Human Rights Monitoring mission in Ukraine "monitored the human rights situation in the peninsula from its presence in mainland Ukraine," the report reads. It adds that: "This report only describes allegations of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law that OHCHR could verify and corroborate."

Meanwhile, on the same day as the report was released, the U.S. State Department called for the quashing of a to-and-a-half year sentence given by a Russian court to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Mykola Semena for inciting separatism. A department spokesperson on Sept. 25 said "the United States is deeply troubled by the decision by a court in Russia-occupied Crimea (to convict Semena)."

"This conviction was based on the fact that Mr. Semena had criticized Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea in his writing," the spokesperson continued. "We call on the Russian occupation authorities to vacate Mr. Semena's conviction, allow him to resume his journalistic activity, and cease their campaign to stifle dissent in Crimea."

Nils Muiznieks, the Council of Europe's Humans Rights Commissioner, joined the fray on Sept. 27, telling RFE/RL's Current Time TV channel that he thought international observers should be deployed to Crimea.

The Ukrainian service of Radio Liberty reported that the commissioner also mentioned that Crimean residents have lodged several complaints in the European Court of Human Rights. However, Russia is not cooperating with attempts to step up a human rights monitoring mission on the peninsula, he said.

Muiznieks has been critical of the Russian occupation from the off. Following a trip to the annexed territory in September 2014, he said that "cases of serious human rights violations, including killings, enforced disappearances, severe physical ill-treatment and arbitrary detention in Crimea since 2014 have to be addressed."

On Sept. 11 he wrote that: "Today's judgement against Akhtem Chiygoz – the vice-chair of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis – by a Russian court in Crimea is difficult to reconcile with Russia's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights."

Chiygoz was sentenced to eight years in jail for organizing mass riots in February 2014. The trial was widely denounced as a sham.

#9
Russia Brazenly Flouts UN Hague Court and Jails Crimean Tatar Leader Ilmi Umerov

by Halya Coynash
Human Rights in Ukraine, 28 September 2017
http://bit.ly/2k5NZfI

In a shock move on September 27, a Russian-controlled 'court' in occupied Crimea sentenced 60-year-old Ilmi Umerov, who has multiple serious illnesses, to two years' imprisonment. Given the suspended sentence of journalist Mykola Semena on analogous charges just one week ago, the conclusion seems clear that the harsher sentence in this case is because Ilmi Umerov is Crimean Tatar. This new sentence of a Crimean Tatar Meljis or representative assembly leader has also come just over two weeks after Akhtem Chiygoz, Deputy Leader of the Mejlis, was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment on legally nihilistic charges concerning a pre-annexation demonstration.

Both Umerov and Semena had been charged with making so-called 'public calls to action aimed at violating Russia's territorial integrity" for calling Crimea Ukraine and opposing Russia's occupation. There were no such 'public calls', even according to Russian legislation, in Semena's article posted as an opinion piece, and the interview given by Umerov on March 19, 2016. Both had certainly upheld Russia's correct territorial borders which do not include annexed Crimea, but they had specifically spoken of the need for only peaceful methods to reinstate those borders.

Nobody was seriously expecting that Umerov would be acquitted, despite the grotesque absurdity of the charges and the defence's presentation of proof that they were based on words that Umerov had not uttered. The de facto prosecutor had, however, demanded a three and a half suspended sentence. Neither 'prosecutor' nor 'judge' are more than puppets in such political cases, and it is Moscow that is behind the decision to pass a two-year real sentence instead. The verdict will be appealed, and therefore concentrated international protest and diplomatic pressure on Russia are vital.

Ilmi Umerov suffers from Parkinson's Disease, diabetes and hypertension, and there have been warnings from Crimean Tatar Mejlis leader Refat Chubarov, lawyer Nikolai Polozov and others that even the minimum security 'colony-settlement' term imposed is an effective death sentence against the Crimean Tatar leader, who would be deprived of decent medical care.

Chubarov calls the sentence against one of the Deputy Heads of the Mejlis "yet another demonstration of the intensifying repression against the Crimean Tatar people carried out by the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea"

The de facto 'judge' Andrei Sergeevich Kulishov also prohibited Umerov from engaging in any public activities for two years. Russia knows that it cannot cower Umerov into silence, and there is a very real danger that he would be taken to serve this monstrous sentence outside Crimea, being thus deprived of contact with his family and lawyers.

Umerov ended his final address to the de facto court on September 18 by saying that he would meet all of those implicated in this case at the international courts at the Hague.

Given the sentence against him, it is worth noting that the UN's International Court of Justice at the Hague has already found grounds for taking preventive measures to stop Russia's ongoing discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in occupied Crimea. Russia is ignoring the Court's order to revoke the ban it imposed on the Mejlis, and has now jailed a second Mejlis leader.

It was clear from the outset that Ilmi Umerov was on trial for his courage and open opposition to Russia's occupation of his homeland. Umerov has never concealed his views and did not start modifying his statements after the criminal proceedings were initiated.

Moscow preferred not to openly prosecute somebody for their opinions and came up with Article 280.1 of the Russian criminal code – the so-called 'public calls' to violate 'Russia's territorial integrity'.

Those, however, needed to be rigged, and it is known that the FSB rejected at least one translation of the interview given by Umerov in Crimean Tatar because the translator did not manufacture the supposed 'public calls'. It found a shoddy translator (K. Saledinov), and FSB 'linguist', Olga Nikolaevna Ivanova, willing to add things that Umerov did not say, and then use these and other words pulled out of context to put him on trial.

Umerov was initially detained on May 12, 2016 , with the indictment asserting that he had, "with intent to carry out activities aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, ... deliberately and publicly called on an unlimited number of people to carry out actions aimed at returning the Republic of Crimea under Ukraine's jurisdiction".

This is, in fact, what the United Nations General Assembly, the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly, the EU and countless other international structures and leaders have called for.

The charges and, now, this sentence are all the more openly repressive in that Umerov did not utter the impugned words and this is very easily proven.

In the interview, Umerov talked of international sanctions and how these should be strengthened. It was the sanctions that would force Russia to leave Crimea and Donbas. The translator added the modal "it's necessary to", thus claiming falsely that Umerov had said that Russia must be forced to leave Crimea.

At one of the previous court hearings, the translator K. Saledinov tried to slip the modal verb in and was caught, with Umerov demanding that he state clearly whether he had heard the word or not. Saledinov tried to ignore the question. When it was repeated by the judge, this alleged translator falsely claimed that "that you can put it in, or not put it in".

As defence lawyer, Mark Feygin, retorted, you can also "sentence somebody to five years, or not sentence them".

Although Ivanova does not know Crimean Tatar, she was almost certainly aware of the deliberate distortion of the words since she avoids mentioning the crucial fact that her assessment was not based on the original text, but on something that could only very loosely be called a translation.

The defence obtained a review of this 'assessment' from the influential Moscow Guild of Linguists. Their report notes that Ivanova's assessment from August 22, 2016 had not reflected part of the original data, with this placing the objectivity of the assessment in doubt.

The experts also pointed to the flagrant infringement of the requirement to provide a comprehensive assessment and the resulting blurring of concepts. This was demonstrated in the lack of any transcript and reliance in her assessment on a translation.

The Guild of Linguists found no justification in Ivanova's conclusion that from a linguistic point of view Umerov's remarks constituted 'calls to extremist activities'.

Her conclusion that the interview contained 'public calls to action aimed at violating Russia's territorial integrity' was based on two alleged utterances, one of which was simply not there, and the other had been pulled out of context and seriously distorted.

All of this was ignored, first by the de facto prosecutor, then by 'judge' Andrei Sergeevych Kulishov, who is already wanted by Ukraine on suspicion of state treason. As Umerov stated in his very powerful final words, these are proceedings where "traitors put patriots on trial".

#10

The Chechen War Moves To Ukraine- And So Does A Wave Of Criminal Violence

by Anna Nemtsova
The Daily Beast, 28 September 2017
http://thebea.st/2y3gFLl

KIEV—Anna Moliar, an outspoken Ukrainian attorney, has watched with growing concern reports about the criminality of Chechen gangs and militia recruits in her country, which already is torn by the ongoing war with pro-Russian militants in the east and south.

"It seems anybody can travel across the eastern border controlled by separatists, sneak in, and commit a crime in Ukraine," Moliar told The Daily Beast.

But the situation is complicated by the fact that some Chechens in Ukraine are just refugees, some are just criminals, some are terrorists, and some have been embraced as freedom fighters because they're fighting the Russians and their proxies, too. In fact, some Chechens fit all those categories.

Almost every week Moliar, a prominent independent criminologist, appears on Kiev's local television channels taking note of the alarming numbers of car bombings, criminal investigations of assassinations, and police special operations. And she is not alone.

Moliar tells The Daily Beast that Ukraine's criminal situation is growing worse than anywhere in Europe, and that many Chechen nationals from Russia are based in the port city of Odessa, which is far from the war front.

"Ukraine has become a very comfortable place for those wanted in Russia for terrorism," she noted, not least because "Chechens can speak Russian here."

Last Saturday, the deputy head of the National Police of Ukraine, Viacheslav Abroskin, posted several photographs of detainees at the moment of arrest.

"I have nothing against Chechen people, but their criminal representatives coming to our country to commit a crime will be seen only in the following poses," Abroskin wrote after a special operation in the southern region of Ukraine. Some of the suspects were spread-eagled, some were face-down on the ground.

But even a crackdown can have dangerous consequences.

"If Ukraine puts pressure on the Chechen militants, there will be a danger of terrorist attacks," said Gregory Shvedov, editor-in-chief of the internet news agency Caucasian Knot and a prominent human rights defender.

Already, amid the widespread unrest in Ukraine, one has a sense of a war within a war that involves Muslim Chechen fighters committed to jihad against Moscow, Muslim Chechen agents dispatched by Ramzan Kadyrov, who is Moscow's man in the Chechen homeland, and other operatives as well.

In the last two to three years Kadyrov has been hunting down what he's described as his "personal enemies" in the Chechen community in nearby Turkey. Many came here.

"We recently conducted a report about Chechens fleeing from Turkey, where it's becoming dangerous for them, to Ukraine, where it is hard for them to obtain a legal status," Shvedov told The Daily Beast. "Since most of them cannot be employed officially, their source of income is unclear."

Making war is in some case the preferred way to make a living.

Radio Liberty recently came out with a report under the headline: "Ukraine: The Second Front of the Chechen War."

Earlier this month a Toyota was bombed right outside of Kiev's popular Besarabsky Market, adding one more victim to the list of assassinations in the Ukrainian capital: Timur Makhauri, a Chechen-born member of a Ukrainian volunteer battalion who had been arrested briefly in Ukraine for illegal possession of weapons.

Earlier Makhauri spent three years, from 2012 to 2015, behind bars in Turkey for the murder of a Chechen Islamist rebel from the so-called Caucasus Emirate, a group defined as a terrorist organization both by Russia and the United States. Jihadists from the group claimed responsibility for organizing violent attacks and killing hundreds of civilians in many regions of Russia.

Some in Ukraine believed that Makhauri was a Russian spy, others that he was a friend of Kiev.
Video watched hundreds of thousands of times on YouTube showed random people helping the wounded passengers, including a terrified, wounded little girl and her mother, who had lost a part of her leg in the explosion.

A week later, investigators still had not made it clear whether the bombing in the center of Kiev was a terrorist attack.

"There are several versions: the assassination could have been ordered by Russian special services—or by somebody here who wanted Makhauri dead," Moliar told The Daily Beast.

Makhauri was one of 100 volunteer soldiers fighting in eastern Ukraine, including veteran Chechen militants with more than two decades of experience in combat against Russia in the wars for Chechen independence; some of them were devoted jihadists, others more

recent recruits to the so-called Islamic State who had become disillusioned with the war in the Middle East.

The war has cost thousands of lives on the battlefield, and even without the Chechen elements there are constant fears of terror attacks behind the lines, whether by the Chechen fighters or, just as often, targeting them.

A fire and then enormous explosions at an arms depot in central Ukraine on Tuesday night only heightened these fears. Authorities blamed "sabotage," and some 30,000 people had to be evacuated.

Chechen commanders taking part in Ukraine's fight against Russian-backed forces say they share a common enemy with the Ukrainian military, so cooperation is natural.

"Our goal is to see the Russian empire fall apart; we are now about 100 people, but, if needed, more than 1,000 Chechens can come to Ukraine from Europe," said Adam Osmayev, the commander of another Chechen battalion, and a particularly interesting figure.

Osmayev and his wife, Amina Akuyeva, are both wanted in Russia for terrorism: Osmayev for organizing assassination attempts on Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov—and on Russian President Vladimir Putin—and Okuyeva for being a long-time supporter of the terrorist underground in Chechnya.

Osmayev has denied his participation in any of the attempts on Kadyrov and Putin.

Today, both Osmayev and Akuyeva are devoted fighters in what they describe as "the war of Chechen liberation," and true supporters of what Kiev calls its Anti-terrorist Operation in Donbas, the east of the country where the Russian-supported insurgents have declared independent "republics."

In June, Akuyeva and Osmayev survived a deadly attack in Kiev, which they say they believe was an assassination attempt ordered either by Russian special services or by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

For many Russians, whatever they may think about the war in Ukraine, there is very little sympathy with the Chechens who claim allegiance to the jihadist group called the Caucasus Emirate.

Russia suffered from terrorism for many years, and the violence is not easily forgotten. On September 1, 2004, there were 1,128 people—mothers, fathers, grandparents and children—were taken hostage inside School #1 of Beslan, a town in the North Caucasus; 32 terrorists were holding them for three days without food, without water, in a terribly hot gym stuffed with explosives.

On the third day of the Beslan crisis the death toll reached 333. Dozens of children died that day, leaving the town heartbroken for generations to come.

The attackers were mostly members of the Chechen Islamist underground. Their leader Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility for the hostage crisis.

Earlier this month the Ukrainian State Border service detained eightarmed men from Chechnya and Dagestan in Chernobayevka, Kherson region, situated more than 300 miles south from Kiev.

The report on the government's website said that the detainees had foreign passports, carried hand grenades, Glock and Makarov pistols, AK-74 assault rifles, sniper rifles, explosives, military uniforms, balaclavas and night vision equipment. The report also mentioned that the detained men "were acting under the cover of a patriotic group" and that they had come to Ukraine illegally.

Were they criminals? Were they terrorists? Were they freedom fighters? In such cases the distinctions are increasingly hard to draw.

#11

Russia Props Up Ukraine Rebels With Coal Sales From War Zone

by Stephan Kravchenko and Anna Andrianova
Bloomberg, 29 September 2017
https://bloom.bg/2xR4emb

Russia is helping Ukrainian rebels sell coal on international markets to raise much-needed cash for pensions and social needs, evading a blockade imposed by the government in Kiev as efforts to implement a peace deal remain stalled.

The separatists are sending nearly 1 million tons of coal per month to Russia across their shared border as of August, boosting income to support the 4 million inhabitants of the breakaway eastern Ukrainian regions, Russian Deputy Economy Minister Sergei Nazarov said. Russia re-exports the coal to third countries via its sea ports, he said in an interview, confirming Ukrainian accusations that it's fostering trade links for the rebels.

"They're solving all their issues with social infrastructure, budget and pensions now," said Nazarov, who was placed on the sanctions list in June by the U.S. Treasury, which said he oversees "projects in the transportation, trade, energy, tax and financial sectors" for the pro-Russian separatists.

Russia and the separatists are deepening ties amid a trade blockade imposed by Ukraine and a lack of progress in enforcing a 2015 peace accord to end the three-year war that's

claimed 10,000 lives. The government in Kiev and its western allies accuse Russia of provoking the conflict after the ouster of Ukraine's Moscow-friendly president in the 2014 revolution, a charge the Kremlin denies. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has no plans to recognize or annex rebel territories, he's moving to ensure the incremental integration of the two border areas with Russia, three people close to the leadership said in April.

Putin this month put forward a plan for United Nations peacekeepers to patrol the cease-fire line in Ukraine between the separatists and government troops. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who wants peacekeepers to cover the entire conflict zone including the border with Russia, rejected the move as an attempt to "cement the occupation."

Coal Deliveries

The blockade of rebel areas, started by veterans of the fighting and formalized by Poroshenko in March, has dented Ukraine's fragile economic recovery and disrupted coal deliveries for power and heat generation. The separatists retaliated by taking over 40 Ukrainian companies in the region, including billionaire Rinat Akhmetov's steel-making and electricity assets.

From his office inside a beige-tiled tower opposite Moscow's zoo, Nazarov, a former coal company director, heads Russia's commission for humanitarian assistance to the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics in eastern Ukraine. The rebels who once depended entirely on aid from Moscow for survival now earn enough from coal sales and local taxation to pay out 5 billion rubles ($86 million) from the budget each month to residents in the region, he said.

Ukrainian prosecutors began an investigation in June into illegal exports of coal from rebel-held regions to Russia, the Prosecutor General's spokeswoman Larisa Sargan said on Facebook, after local media reported that anthracite went to Turkey via the Russian port of Rostov-on-Don. The separatists also send coal to at least seven other countries, Ukrainian Energy Minister Ihor Nasalyk said in July, the BBC reported.

Sanctions, Blockade

There's little Ukraine can do to stop the trade. Nazarov declined to disclose which countries receive coal from rebel-held areas of Ukraine, or the scale of total revenue generated by the sales. Depending on the quality, exports of thermal anthracite sell for between $100 and $160 per ton.

Russia doesn't need to use the rebel coal itself, Nazarov said. Russian Deputy Energy Minister Anatoly Yanovsky said in August that Russia is a transit country for most of the coal but is also using some at a power station in Rostov region.

Many of Putin's inner circle and state-owned companies are under U.S. and European Union sanctions over Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and support for the eastern Ukrainian separatists. Russia's unlikely to face penalties over the coal trade because "the rebels don't exist in the international legal framework" and its coal exports aren't affected by the sanctions, said Andrey Movchan, director of the economic policy program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Poroshenko has said he'll only lift the blockade once Ukraine regains control over its industry and rebel forces withdraw weapons from the cease-fire line. Ukraine struck a deal in July to buy U.S. coal to help plug a deficit caused by the loss of supplies from the east.

The government in Kiev should end the blockade first because the measure "burned bridges" with the separatists and made it impossible to discuss reintegration of the region into Ukraine, Nazarov said.

If this happened, Russia would support Ukraine resuming control of its assets in rebel areas because this "would mean one less headache" for Moscow, he said. Ukraine may restore transport, energy and financial ties with the region "in one month," Nazarov said.

A Russian effort to annex the rebel areas in the same way as it took over Crimea would be a "heavy burden" economically, Nazarov said. Officials haven't calculated the costs because such a decision "isn't expected," he said.

#12
Pro-Russian Separatists Harden Split from Ukraine

by Christian Neef
Spiegel Online, 28 July 2017
http://bit.ly/2vfguvm

The city of Yenakiieve, northeast of Donetsk, was founded more than a century ago around a steel mill. Some 10,000 people work at the steel mill, and the company that owns it operates the most modern rolling mill in Ukraine. But as of March, the mill became a thing of the past.

On the morning of March 1, armed men arrived at the plant, demanding that management submit to the regime of the "Donetsk People's Republic." If they refused, the men said, "legal and physical measures" would be taken against management and employees. What seemed like a farce at first would prove to be a major political move. In doing so, the pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk have divided the country even further.

The nationalization of Ukrainian companies was a violation of the Minsk Agreement. As part of the 2015 accord, the parties to the conflict agreed to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity. But it would not be the last violation. Last week, the separatists took the step of proclaiming their own state, calling it "Little Russia." Before that, Russian President Vladimir Putin had indirectly threatened to recognize such a state.

Since the spring of 2014, the regions have been occupied by pro-Russian rebels, who seceded from Ukraine with Russian support. It was a serious blow to Ukraine, especially from an economic standpoint. Until then, eastern Ukraine had been responsible for a fifth of the country's entire industrial production. There are hundreds of mines in the region, together with Europe's largest coking plants, important nonferrous metal and chemical plants. Much of the country's electricity had also been generated in eastern Ukraine.

Although the separatists took over city halls and police stations in a coup three years ago, the large companies initially remained in the hands of their Ukrainian owners. They continued to produce as if nothing had happened. The separatists tolerated this because the businesses provided tens of thousands of jobs in the people's republics. There was fighting at the front, but Ukraine continued to supply iron ore to the separatist region. In return, for three years, trains filled with anthracite traveled from the separatist region across the border, destined for Ukrainian thermal power plants.

The system worked until early this year, when Ukrainian nationalists put a stop to deliveries of goods in both directions. Trading with the enemy, they said, was tantamount to "funding terrorism." Because Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko didn't dare to break up the blockade, he declared the suspension of trade. In doing so, he provided the separatists with an excuse to cut themselves off even further from Ukraine.

It was a major turning point in the history of the war in eastern Ukraine, a conflict already known for its twists and turns. Soon afterward, the people's republics nationalized 53 Ukrainian companies in their territory. Russia supported the takeover. Moscow could "understand, to a certain extent" the "temporary administration" of the businesses by the governments of the people's republics, Putin's spokesman said.

Most of the plants that have now been nationalized are part of the empire of Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. He was not only forced to write off the Yenakiieve steel mill, but also another steel mill, two coking plants, a pipe mill, three large coal mines and a thermal power plant, as well as the stadium in Donetsk he had built for the 2012 football European Championship. His losses run into the billions.

The management of the affected plants refused to agree to the separatists' conditions. They stopped production and the workers were sent home. The top managers left for Ukraine on March 1. What has happened to the companies since then? Have the separatists placed them back into operation? And if so, where are they getting their raw materials from and where are they sending the steel and coke they produce?

It's difficult to find answers to these questions. The people's republics are providing no information, and Russia acts as if it has nothing to do with it all. It is also unwilling to provide proof that the occupied territories are surviving exclusively on Russian assistance. The events surrounding the nationalized companies are one of the best-kept secrets of the people's republics.

Journalists Barred from Entry

The authorities in Donetsk are particularly averse to journalists these days. Our request for accreditation was denied by the Information Ministry in March, in an email that read: "The accreditation of the Der Spiegel journalists in the Donetsk People's Republic is denied." Accreditation had been issued in previous years. And without the necessary documents, it is no longer possible to pass through the checkpoints at the line of demarcation.

The separatist territories are also increasingly difficult to reach by telephone. Using WhatsApp, we finally manage to contact one of the best-known men in the Donetsk Republic, Alexander Khodakovsky, the former military head of the republic and commander of the Vostak ("East") militia battalion, and later the head of state security and a member of the separatist parliament.

A year and a half ago, Khodakovsky quarreled with the Donetsk leadership. Today he is primarily involved with his movement, the Patriotic Forces of the Donbass. He says he's concerned about developments in his republic.

"We are experiencing growing losses at the front," he says, adding that the military situation is deteriorating. What soldier is willing to risk his life for 15,000 rubles a month, or about 220 euros? "Without Russia, Ukraine would have strangled us long ago."

Khodakovsky says he was opposed to a premature nationalization of the Ukrainian plants. Some 100,000 people were employed there, "a tenth of our population." The takeover of the companies "was a spontaneous decision."

So, who's in charge of the campaign? All the plants, he says, were placed under the control of a company called Wneschtorgserwis. It is registered in South Ossetia, the small Caucasus republic that was de facto taken over by Russia after the 2008 war against Georgia. This approach was used to cover up what was happening in the nationalized plants and Moscow's role in the matter, he explains, adding that it was necessary to avoid the imposition of international sanctions on the companies involved.

Considerable Russian Influence

Khodakovsky says entire factories are being dismantled and sold to Russia, including the equipment from the October mine. “Of course, Mr. Surkov exerts a great deal of influence on what is happening here,” says Khodakovsky. “I would say he is the leading figure here.”

Vladislav Surkov, the former chief ideologue at the Kremlin, is now Putin’s personal adviser and his envoy to the people’s republics. He never made an appearance at the Minsk negotiations over Ukraine, but he has turned up in Donetsk and Luhansk. Western diplomats say that nothing functions without this man, which is why they meet regularly with Surkov in his office in the presidential administration on the Old Square in Moscow. Their last meeting with Surkov was in June.

There is little information available about Wneschtorgserwis. No one knows who runs it and how it is structured. It is known, however, that the company has reportedly delivered 140,000 tons of iron ore to steel mills in the Donbass region since April, for $18 million, and that it has begun exporting steel to Russia from there, as well as anthracite from the mines.

Wneschtorgserwis does have a PR representative. His name is Viktor Nikolayenko and he can sometimes be reached via the internet. Nikolayenko promised to smuggle DER SPIEGEL journalists into the separatist region and open a few plants for a visit. But then he went silent for weeks until, in May, he finally wrote that Moscow had strictly forbidden any interaction with the press -- yet another indication of where the decisions are made.

We did at least succeed in obtaining details about the true situation in the confiscated plants. When the people’s republics took over the factories in March, officials said they would be “up and running again within two months.” But almost nothing has happened to date. The plants lack competent managers, raw materials and funds. At first the workers were still being paid 90 percent of their wages, but now more and more are complaining about severe cuts.

In early June, the Donetsk Republic decided to stop pumping water out of several mines and to dismiss the miners. Even in mines still in operation, like the Sassyadko mine in Donetsk, workers are pressured to quit, while others are advised to join the people’s militias. The working week in government-owned coal companies was reduced to two days on July 1, and wages were reduced by more than half. The confiscated Donetsk smelting works has suspended operations because diesel fuel is no longer available. And the situation in the vicinity of the wagon manufacturing plant in Stakhanov is now so dramatic that the management requested 1,500 food packets from the leadership of the people’s republic.

A Political Decision'

Dennis Denissov admits that Russia needs neither the steel nor the coal from the Donbass mines, which is what makes the situation so dramatic. Denissov is close to the deputy head of the government in Donetsk, who controls the nationalized companies. He works for a foundation that organizes assistance for the Donbass region from Moscow. He also promises to provide access to the people's republics.

Dennisov says it was "a political decision" for Moscow to provide the affected companies with a loan for 10 billion rubles. Given that Russia doesn't want to buy the separatists' products, other buyers need to be found. He says there are potential buyers in the Baltics and in Serbia. The products are shipped through the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk -- with forged documents to conceal their origin.

However, the Russian support has not eased the situation. In mid-July, Oplot ("Bullwark"), the separatists' television station, announced that the leadership of the Donetsk Republic had established a commission to search for solutions for the affected companies.

At almost the same time, Denissov contacted DER SPIEGEL once again, saying that he had had to complete a security inquiry in Moscow first. Unfortunately, he added, the outcome was negative: "You are not welcome in the territory of our republic." Eastern Ukraine, it appears, has become terra incognita.

#13

Critics: Parliament Passes Law That Would Make Many Graft Investigations Impossible

by Oksana Grytsenko and Oleg Sukhov
KyivPost, 3 October 2017
http://bit.ly/2fNb5mp

Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, on Oct. 3 passed a judicial reform bill that would make it almost impossible to investigate many criminal cases, including corruption cases against top officials, critics of the legislation say.

The reform legislation also enables the functioning of the controversial new Supreme Court, 25 members of which have been deemed corrupt or dishonest by the Public Integrity Council, a judicial reform watchdog.

Under the bill, prosecutors would have to file notices of suspicion for suspects in criminal cases within six months for grave crimes, and within three months for crimes of medium severity. Otherwise, such cases would have to be closed.

Moreover, all cases must be sent to trial within two months after a notice of suspicion is filed, according to the bill.

This clause was initiated by Radical Party lawmaker Andriy Lozovy.

Sergii Gorbatuk, head of the in absentia cases department at the Prosecutor General's Office, said that Lozovy had a conflict of interest in this case because the bill will affect him personally and will let him escape criminal responsibility. Lozovy is suspected by the Prosecutor General's Office of evading taxes worth Hr 1.83 million.

Gorbatuk also said that all ongoing EuroMaidan investigations would have to be closed because of the bill.

"It is impossible to investigate complicated crimes, especially corruption and economic crimes, within such terms," Vitaly Shabunin, head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center's executive board, said on Facebook. "This kills anti-corruption reform and any legal responsibility for any serious crimes."

Shabunin said the clause would enable the authorities to close corruption cases against State Fiscal Service Chief Roman Nasirov, ex-People's Front lawmaker Mykola Martynenko, and Central Election Commission Chairman Mykhailo Okhendovsky.

Reformist lawmaker Mustafa Nayyem said on Facebook that the clause would also force prosecutors to close some cases against ex-President Viktor Yanukovych and his cronies.

Nayyem said the clause was likely being used as a way to persuade the Opposition Bloc, an offshoot of Yanukovych's Party of Regions, to support the judicial reform bill as a whole, since it would allow many lawmakers from this faction to avoid being prosecuted for their actions under Yanukovych.

Another reformist lawmaker, Sergii Leshchenko, claimed that Lozovy's Radical Party is financed by Ukraine's richest man Rinat Akhmetov, a sponsor of the Opposition Bloc.

Lozovy dismissed the accusations, saying that his clause will prevent delays of legal proceedings and protect people from groundless charges. "I'm proud of my amendment," he said.

The judicial reform bill would also allow judges to ban the filming of court hearings even in open trials, and to prevent visitors from attending them if there are not enough seats. Critics say this will deal a major blow to the judiciary's transparency.

The judicial reform bill was supported by President Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, the People's Front, and three offshoots of the Party of Regions – the Opposition Bloc, Vidrodzhennya (Revival) and Volya Narodu (People's Will).

Verkhovna Rada Speaker Andriy Parubiy ignored opposition lawmakers' complaints that the vote was falsified because several lawmakers illegally voted for their colleagues.

Meanwhile, the Public Integrity Council on Oct. 3 urged Poroshenko not to sign any of the new Supreme Court's 111 judges' credentials until courts issue rulings on alleged violations made during the Supreme Court competition and until the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission publish explanations on why they rejected the Public Integrity Council's vetoes on candidates deemed corrupt or dishonest.

The violations of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission include setting a third minimum score for candidates during the first stage of the competition, failing to set a minimum score for psychological and social testing, refusing to publish candidates' practical works and scores given for each criterion of integrity and professional ethics and failing to explain any motives for its rejection of the Public Integrity Council's vetoes, the civic watchdog said. The High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission have denied the accusations.

"Under Article 127 of Ukraine's Constitution, only candidates who meet ethical standards can be appointed as judges," the Public Integrity Council said in a statement. "We believe that the High Council of Justice ignored its constitutional duty and lost the chance of restoring citizens' trust in the judiciary."

The council also said that it had "grounds to assume that the competition was rigged to appoint candidates handpicked beforehand, and the Public Integrity Council was used to legitimize this process."

The Public Integrity Council also asked Poroshenko to initiate an international audit of the Supreme Court competition and a restructuring of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission, which have failed to restore trust in the judiciary.

Newly-appointed Supreme Court judges Vyacheslav Nastavny and Serhiy Slynko participated in the political persecution of Yuriy Lutsenko, now prosecutor general, and the Pavlychenko family under ex-President Viktor Yanukovych. Both cases have been recognized as political by Ukrainian and European authorities.

Another new Supreme Court judge, Bohdan Lvov, is being investigated for illegal interference in the automatic distribution of cases by ex-High Commercial Court Chief Viktor Tatkov and his former deputy Artur Yemelyanov, who have been officially charged in a criminal case. He is also under investigation over alleged bribery in a criminal case against High Council of Justice member Pavlo Grechkivsky, who has been charged with fraud.

Lvov has also been investigated for making an unlawful ruling, and the Supreme Court has ruled that one of Lvov's rulings violated human rights and involved interference in the automatic distribution of court cases.

#14
Corruption Battle Roils Ukraine

by James Marson
Wall Street Journal, 12 September 2017
http://on.wsj.com/2wnNXBI

KIEV, Ukraine—A push for overhauls encouraged by Ukraine's Western backers is deepening divisions in the government, including a call by some officials for the dismissal or investigation of the reformist finance minister.

The clash has raised concern in the U.S. and European Union and presents a new challenge for the country's economy, which is recovering from a two-year recession sparked by Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and military interventions in Ukraine's east.

Finance Minister Oleksandr Danylyuk is point man for talks with the International Monetary Fund that were set to continue this week, and has driven efforts to overhaul state finances and cut official interference in business, steps seen as key in curbing corruption.

An effort by Mr. Danylyuk and others to weaken the state's hand in the economy and overhaul inefficient state sectors has spurred attacks from opponents who accuse him of hindering their work.

"This is not surprising," Mr. Danylyuk said. "We are working to change the old system and the old rules, and quite logically, the system is fighting back."

The general prosecutor, Yuriy Lutsenko, who was appointed by President Petro Poroshenko, told his staff in late August that he had written to the prime minister asking him to fire Mr. Danylyuk, according to Mr. Lutsenko's spokeswoman. Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman's spokesman didn't respond to a request for comment.

Two other senior officials have publicly called for investigations of Mr. Danylyuk's finances and budget decisions.

Mr. Danylyuk has denied any wrongdoing and said the multiple allegations he has faced were "distractions, often intentional and aimed to derail."

The finance minister gained a firmer grip on his job recently when the General Prosecutor's Office closed an investigation into allegations that he had evaded taxes, according to the Finance Ministry.

He began meeting with international investors on Monday with the aim of placing Ukraine's first Eurobond since restructuring around $15 billion of foreign debt in 2015.

Other reformist officials and anticorruption activists have complained of official pressure—causing unease in the West. The U.S., like the EU, has provided financial support to the Ukraine government when it carried out certain economic and anticorruption overhauls.

"Members of civil society play vital role for transparency; targeting them is a step backwards," the U.S. Embassy in Kiev tweeted in March.

Ukraine's Western backers have praised economic and governance changes since a pro-Western government came to power in 2014, but have taken a more critical tone in recent months as progress on overhauls has slowed.

"Ukraine needs to continue moving aggressively to strengthen the rule of law and to limit the influence of entrenched interests," U.S. Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch said in August.

The IMF, too, has criticized what it says is slow progress on steps needed to open up Ukraine's economy and spur growth. First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton was set to visit to Kiev amid concerns about whether Ukraine can push ahead with such measures.

The IMF has provided billions of dollars in loans to Ukraine in return for measures to strengthen state finances. Yet calls by the IMF and others for privatizations and creation of a land market have faced resistance from some lawmakers who argue the changes would benefit few people. Long-promised efforts to strengthen rule of law through changes to the judicial system have stalled.

Corruption and economic inequality have fueled two revolutions in Ukraine in the past decade and a half, and surveys show many Ukrainians are unhappy with progress under Mr. Poroshenko, whose approval rating stood at 17% in July, according to pollster GfK Ukraine.

The president has notched some successes since taking office in 2014 with the country in recession and facing conflict in its east. Ukraine launched its Anticorruption Bureau, started cleaning up its banking system and moved to strengthen the finances of the state energy company.

"This is the most-open and transparent government we've had in Ukraine," said Andy Hunder, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine. "We want to see more, such as new, noncorrupt courts, privatization of state-owned enterprises and continuation of the IMF program."

As finance minister since April 2016, Mr. Danylyuk, a 42-year-old former McKinsey & Co. consultant and investment-fund head, has led an overhaul of the system for value- added tax refunds, for years a venue for corruption. He has helped draft legislation needed to unlock further IMF loans this fall, and is working to overhaul the state fiscal service by cutting bureaucracy, allowing online submissions and abolishing the tax Police.

He is also trying to crimp the budget of the powerful General Prosecutor's Office and reduce the powers of law-enforcement agencies to investigate economic crimes.

Anticorruption activists have accused such agencies of corrupt abuse of their powers. "Every day people come [to me] with stories of raids on business by the Security Service of Ukraine, the Interior Ministry and prosecutors," said Serhiy Leshchenko, a lawmaker and former muckraking journalist. None of the agencies responded to requests for comment.

"Danylyuk is a key anchor in terms of reforms," said Timothy Ash, senior sovereign strategist for emerging markets at BlueBay Asset Management in London. "He's likely trodden on a few people's toes."

Some activists and officials who target corruption are also complaining of intimidation. The U.S.-funded Anti-Corruption Action Center, an NGO, said its staff has faced a campaign of harassment, including tax probes and a video portraying a fictional investigation into the finances of its director.

Artem Sytnyk, the head of the government's Anticorruption Bureau, which is tasked with investigating high-level corruption, has complained of pressure on his detectives.

#15
The Last Hurdle for Ukraine's Recovery

By Anders Aslund
Project Syndicate, 20 September 2017
http://bit.ly/2xY8sZY

Ukraine has made remarkable progress on reducing its fiscal deficit and public debt, positioning the economy for strong growth. But, as is so often the case in post-Soviet states, old-school clientelism could quickly smother the promise of prosperity.
KYIV – Ukraine's capital abounds with signs of hope and anarchy. The country has experienced an impressive economic turnaround, but corruption remains rife. President Petro Poroshenko's administration has stabilized public finances, but failed to rein in clientelism.

The question now is whether any judicial and legal reforms that Poroshenko undertakes can establish the conditions for strong, sustained economic growth. Since concluding a

loan agreement with the government in March 2015, the International Monetary Fund has followed through with four substantial disbursements. But on a recent visit, IMF First Deputy Managing Director David Liptonwarned that there are risks of Ukraine "going backwards."

Ukraine's problems are not macroeconomic. The government's current finance minister, Oleksandr Danyliuk, is an avowed free marketeer with a strong record of economic management, as was his predecessor, Natalie Jaresko.

According to the IMF, Ukraine's public expenditures in 2014 totaled 53% of GDP, but had fallen to 40% of GDP by 2016. And in just one year, from 2014 to 2015, Ukraine slashed its budget deficit from 10% of GDP to a mere 2%. It is now on track to maintain a deficit of around 3% of GDP in the coming years.

Moreover, thanks to improvements in the tax system, state revenues increased by 30% year on year in the first half of 2017, outpacing growth in expenditures. As a result, the government had a balanced budget in January-June.

In April, the IMF projected that Ukraine's public debt would stand at 91% of GDP at the end of 2017; but the government has already brought its debt down to 81% of GDP. This progress will likely continue as growth strengthens and Ukraine's currency, the hryvnia, appreciates.

Ukraine owes much of its economic strength today to Valeriya Hontareva, the former chair of the central bank who cleaned up the banking sector over the past three years. Under Hontareva, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) shut down half of the country's 180 banks, most of which were corrupt – if not outright criminal – operations. And now that the restructuring is almost complete, lending is set to take off.

Typically, when a country gets its domestic finances in order, its external finances improve, too. Ukraine's foreign-exchange reserves have been a major cause of concern since 2014; but today, they stand at a reassuring $18 billion – equal to about 3.5 months of current imports.

Better still, the hryvnia has strengthened by 6% against the dollar this year. This has boosted GDP and reduced the public debt, which is predominantly held in international currencies. At the same time, Ukraine is undergoing a relatively fast "de-dollarization," such that hryvnia-denominated bank deposits are now growing faster than those in foreign currencies.

Ukraine has the three essential ingredients for strong, sound growth. In the first half of 2017, the European Union-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area took effect, and Ukraine's exports skyrocketed by 25%, far outpacing import growth. Moreover, Ukraine has strong investment and consumption growth. In the first half of this year, construction surged by 24%, and retail sales increased by 8%.

But while the IMF has projected 2.9% GDP growth for 2017 – and annual growth of 4% by 2020 – annualized growth in the first half of this year was just 2.5%. There are a few reasons why Ukraine's newfound financial stability hasn't yet led to a stronger growth takeoff.

For starters, the fighting in eastern Ukraine has disrupted the agricultural sector, the leading source of growth for the last decade. But, more important, Ukraine's "animal spirits" may be suppressed, because its entrepreneurs see little point in trying to compete with oligarchs who remain able to rig the economy in their favor.

Over the past three years, the government has started (with a shove from the IMF) to combat corruption in a systematic way, including by unifying energy prices and introducing a transparent electronic procurement system for most public purchases. And so far, more than 100,000 public officials have publicly disclosed their incomes and assets in a display of transparency that rivals Scandinavian countries.

But the government's failure to uphold the rule of law remains a serious problem. Previously, domestic businesses and foreign investors worried that the tax authorities were abusing their power. But in March, Ukraine's anticorruption bureau arrested the country's tax chief, Roman Nasirov. Now, the biggest cause for concern is the Prosecutor General's office and the security services. Both are under the president's control, and both have come to be widely regarded as predatory state agencies.

It is hoped that judicial reforms currently in the works will check executive authority, secure property rights, and thus encourage growth. But it is already clear that more will be needed.

In July, Poroshenko stripped the citizenship of Mikhail Saakashvili, the former President of Georgia whom Poroshenko invited to Ukraine and appointed governor of Odessa in 2015. Poroshenko's decision, carried out by decree and without due process, is legally dubious, and Saakashvili, rather than accepting his fate, has used his denationalization to galvanize Ukrainian civil society. This month, he and the Ukrainian opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko entered Ukraine from Poland without going through passport control. By inviting prosecution, Saakashvili has gained a platform from which he can criticize Ukraine's justice system and Poroshenko's neglect of the rule of law.

The IMF's demand that the Ukrainian government establish an independent anticorruption court to investigate, prosecute, and punish dishonest public officials remains unfulfilled. But if Ukraine is to continue on the road to recovery, it will have to demonstrate that no one – not even the president – is above the law.

#16

Ukrainian Language Bill Facing Barrage of Criticism From Minorities, Foreign Capitals

by Tony Wesolowsky
RFE/RL, 24 September 2017
http://bit.ly/2ypyCB7

Timeya Leshko doesn't see much of a future for her four children in Ukraine, where a Moscow-backed conflict still flares up in the east and economic opportunities seem few and far between elsewhere.

"There's no way to earn a living here. Everyone knows that. All the young people are leaving," Leshko told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service in a recent interview. "And I don't think it's going to get better, only worse."

The ethnic Hungarian in the sleepy village of Mali Heivtsi on Ukraine's western fringes, not far from Slovakia and Hungary, is convinced that learning her native tongue is the ticket out for her kids.

But that may be tougher for Leshko and other ethnic minorities in Ukraine after the country's parliament passed an educational-reform bill on September 5 that includes a clause making Ukrainian the required language of study in state schools from the fifth grade on.

Leshko is not a fan of the bill, which would roll back the option for lessons to be taught in other languages.

"I don't like it. Why? Because, for example, I am a Hungarian. I was studying in a Hungarian school and I want my children also to speak Hungarian," she explained. "Maybe they will move to Hungary or maybe they will go there to earn money. In that case, the Hungarian language will be more useful than Ukrainian, I think."

Leshko is not alone in her animosity toward the legislation. Officials from Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Russia -- all countries with significant ethnic communities in Ukraine -- have all heaped vitriol on it.

Language is a hot-button issue across Ukraine but especially in the country's majority Russian-speaking eastern regions. Russia-backed separatists gained de facto control over areas of Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions following the country's 2014 Euromaidan revolution, and fighting continues there between the separatists and Ukrainian forces.

Russia's Foreign Ministry said on September 5 that the law is designed to "forcefully establish a mono-ethnic language regime in a multinational state."

A day later, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said that Ukraine "stabbed Hungary in the back" with the law.

Amid the barrage, Ukrainian officials have circled the wagons.

Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin wrote on Twitter earlier this month that the law would not hamper the free development of other languages in Ukraine.

President Petro Poroshenko has described the legislation as a "key to the future of education in the country" but has yet to sign it into law, possibly due to the controversy.

Klimkin and Ukrainian Education Minister Lilia Hrynevych are due to meet EU officials in the near future to allay any possible fears. Hrynevych recently announced that Kyiv would ask the Council of Europe to assess the legislation.

The bill's language requirement would overturn a 2012 law passed under Moscow-friendly former President Viktor Yanukovych, who fled to Russia and was deposed amid the Euromaidan protests. That legislation allowed for minorities to introduce their languages in regions where they represented more than 10 percent of the population.

Some saw that option as a ticking time bomb for Ukraine.

"This would mean the adoption of regional languages in about 13 of Ukraine's 27 regions," explained Olga Shumylo Tapiola in a Carnegie Europe posting at the time. She even warned that the law "may ultimately bring about the demise of the Ukrainian language and strengthen the split between western and eastern Ukraine."

There are more than 15,000 schools across Ukraine. Of these, according to data from the Ukrainian Education Ministry, Russian is used as the primary language in 581; Romanian in 75; Hungarian in 71; and Polish in five. Some 400,000 students are enrolled at these minority-language schools.

Ethnic Russians make up 17 percent of Ukraine's population of 45 million, according to the World Population Review. Other minorities, including Hungarians, Poles, and Romanians, each make up less than 1 percent of the population.

The wording of the controversial legislation is somewhat vague. It states that the language of instruction in the first four grades may be in a minority language. By grade five, however, only two or more subjects can be taught in any of the languages of the EU. That rules out Russian, but includes Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian. The legislation foresees a two-year transition period before fully taking effect in 2020.

Despite the outcry over the language clause, the package of educational reforms of which it is a part has been largely praised, including by Washington.

The bill mandates 7 percent of GDP be allocated for education. School would also be compulsory for 12 years. Schools and teachers would have more autonomy over setting curriculum than before, and teacher pay would be raised. The legislation emphasizes that education be more about understanding and skills rather than rote memorization.

Those progressive steps, however, have been drowned out by the uproar over the language requirement.

#17
New Book

Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine
Penguin Random House
10 October 2017
http://bit.ly/2ytr98r

From the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning *Gulag* and the National Book Award finalist *Iron Curtain*, a revelatory history of one of Stalin's greatest crimes—the consequences of which still resonate today

In 1929 Stalin launched his policy of agricultural collectivization—in effect a second Russian revolution—which forced millions of peasants off their land and onto collective farms. The result was a catastrophic famine, the most lethal in European history. At least five million people died between 1931 and 1933 in the USSR. But instead of sending relief the Soviet state made use of the catastrophe to rid itself of a political problem. In *Red Famine*, Anne Applebaum argues that more than three million of those dead were Ukrainians who perished not because they were accidental victims of a bad policy but because the state deliberately set out to kill them.

Applebaum proves what has long been suspected: after a series of rebellions unsettled the province, Stalin set out to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry. The state sealed the republic's borders and seized all available food. Starvation set in rapidly, and people ate anything: grass, tree bark, dogs, corpses. In some cases, they killed one another for food. Devastating and definitive, *Red Famine*captures the horror of ordinary people struggling to survive extraordinary evil.

Today, Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union, has placed Ukrainian independence in its sights once more. Applebaum's compulsively readable narrative recalls one of the worst crimes of the twentieth century, and shows how it may foreshadow a new threat to the political order in the twenty-first.

ANNE APPLEBAUM is a columnist for The Washington Post, a Professor of Practice at the London School of Economics, and a contributor to The New York Review of Books. Her previous books include Iron Curtain, winner of the Cundill Prize and a finalist

#18
Historian Anne Applebaum Details Stalin's War Against Ukraine: 'I Believe It Was Genocide'

by Natalya Golitsina
RFE/RL, 25 September 2017
http://bit.ly/2fBcyQg

The latest book by Pulitzer Prize-winning American historian Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin's War On Ukraine, sheds new light on one of the seminal events in Ukrainian history – the deadly famine of 1932-33 that Ukrainians call the Holodomor. Some 4 million Ukrainians were killed in a famine that was engineered by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin to eliminate a perceived threat to central Soviet power.

RFE/RL Russian Service correspondent Natalya Golitsina spoke with Applebaum about this tragedy and the role it continues to play in Ukraine's relations with Russia.

RFE/RL: What caused the Holodomor?

Anne Applebaum: The Holodomor was created deliberately by Stalin. There was, in 1932, the beginnings of broad Soviet famine that was caused by collectivization and the grain-requisitions policy. By the autumn of 1932, Stalin decided to make use of this crisis, to use it in order to target Ukraine specifically. And at that time, as my book shows, there were a number of measures taken that specifically affected Ukraine: blacklisting of particular farms and towns and villages, a cordon around the border so that people were unable to leave Ukraine, special measures against Ukrainian cultural institutions and the Ukrainian language. And these were all undertaken at the same time.

I do believe that was intended to kill more people in Ukraine and that it did so and that the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party knew that this was happening. Yes, it was an intentional famine.

RFE/RL: And Stalin was responsible?

Applebaum: Stalin is personally responsible, but a lot of other people were also responsible, too. The famine was carried out with the help of Ukrainian bureaucrats, the Ukrainian Communist Party, as well as by Russians and Soviet leaders who came into the country from outside.

In order to carry out a famine like this – remember, it involved removing the food (not only grain, but also other kinds of food) from people's homes -- in order to carry it out, they needed many people. So I would say there was a wider social responsibility.

RFE/RL: Why would Stalin target Ukraine in this way?

Applebaum: Stalin was afraid of counterrevolution and he was particularly afraid of Ukraine. He remembered that during the Civil War era, there had been a major peasant rebellion in Ukraine. And in 1932, he knew there had been an armed uprising in opposition to collectivization in Ukraine. And he also knew that there were many people in Moscow who were upset more generally about collectivization and about its impact.

Actually, in the autumn of 1932 when they passed the decrees that were designed specifically toward Ukraine, one of the decrees they passed was an end to [the 1920s-era policy of] 'Ukrainization' – that is, language and culture, the propagation of Ukrainian identity. This was seen as somehow counterrevolutionary and dangerous and they sought to end it. He was afraid that this would harm him. So, the famine, along with a crackdown on Ukrainian intellectuals – these two things together were an attempt to make sure there would be no counterrevolution coming from Ukraine.

I think that for Stalin, Ukraine represented an idea. The idea of an independent Ukraine was a challenge to central Soviet power that could potentially undermine the Soviet state. This is what he believed. I think he also believed a sovereign Ukraine would find allies, would ally themselves with Poland or other countries and they might not be loyal to the Soviet system. For him, it was very important to eliminate this Ukrainian idea. He believed it was a challenge to the Soviet idea.

And I should say that if you step back and look at it, he may have been right because, of course, the revival of the Ukrainian idea that happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, ultimately leading to an independent Ukraine in 1991, did help undermine the Soviet Union. It was a challenge and a real threat to Soviet power – and [Stalin] sought to eliminate it in any way.

RFE/RL: How many people died as a result of the Holodomor?

Applebaum: Over the last several years, a team of really good Ukrainian demographers has gone back through the archival material and has looked at local birth and death records. And the number they have come up with is that 3.9 million -- nearly 4 million people -- died in Ukraine. So-called excess deaths. In other words, more than the number of people who would normally have died. So we can say that that is the number of people who died.

The numbers have been difficult to calculate because the Soviet system tried to cover up the famine immediately after it happened, even going to the extent of covering up and hiding a census that was taken in 1937, which showed large numbers of deaths. But this

team of Ukrainian demographers recently has come up with, I think, finally, very good numbers.

RFE/RL: There has been much debate over whether the Holodomor should be considered an act of genocide. Where do you stand on that?

Applebaum: I'm very happy to call it a genocide, according to the original definition of the word genocide as it was invented by Raphael Lemkin, who was the lawyer who came up with the term. I think it fits perfectly into his definition of genocide.

I know it is more difficult to do so in international law because of the way that international law was written and in particular because the UN Convention on Genocide was created with the help of the Soviet Union, which was very anxious not to include Ukrainian famine and other Soviet crimes. I know that legally it can be more difficult to do it, but, yes, of course, I believe in essence it was a genocide.

RFE/RL: Why didn't the Soviet Union seek international assistance during the famine as it did during other famines in the 1920s?

Applebaum: The Soviet Union didn't ask for assistance in 1932 and 1933 partly because Stalin didn't want the world to know that collectivization, which he was trumpeting as a great triumph – he didn't want people to know that it was a real disaster. He didn't want people inside the Soviet Union to know and he didn't want people abroad to know.

"I think that for Putin, Ukraine represents a challenge a little bit the way Ukrainian sovereignty was a challenge for Stalin."

But, of course, the second reason was that he was using this general famine to target Ukraine. He wasn't interested in saving people. He wanted the peasants, as a group, to be weakened and he didn't want people to survive. So there was no effort to collect international aid.

RFE/RL: How were the grain requisitions carried out?

Applebaum: It is important to note that the famine was not just the result of grain requisition, although that was the most important part of it. Brigades of activists came through Ukrainian villages and they took not only grain but everything else. They took all other kinds of food – vegetables, beets, potatoes. There were meat quotas they had to fulfill. They took everything they could out of people's homes. It was a crude and violent operation.

In the course of doing so, they would beat people up and throw them out of their homes. They would attack them and torture them in order to get them to... They believed the peasants were hiding grain and food. And, of course, sometimes they were. So they would torment people in order to get them to give up the grain and the food. It was a very violent

and chaotic operation. But the long-term effect of it was that people were left with literally nothing. They would have no food in their houses at all.
RFE/RL: How widespread was cannibalism in Ukraine at this time?

Applebaum: Cannibalism wasn't common, but it did happen and there were many incidents of it that were reported to police. They knew about it, the authorities knew about it, and they would have passed it on to higher levels. It is important to note that even then, even when there was no food at all, cannibalism was never considered normal. It always evoked reactions of horror. Cannibals were often arrested.

People began speaking again about the famine right at the time when Ukrainian independence became something that was possible again."

There is some evidence that cannibals were later on even kept together in the [gulag] camp system. There were reports of people who saw them on the Solovetsky Islands a little bit later on. It was, if not common, it was there and in almost every one of the famine districts there were incidents of cannibalism. And there are descriptions in the archives and in people's memoirs.

RFE/RL: Did Ukrainians fight back, resist during the Holodomor?

Applebaum: There was initially resistance to collectivization. And then there was resistance to requisitions. People hid their grain. Later on, when the famine began, there was very little resistance because people were simply too hungry and not able to resist anymore. But there were also some Ukrainian peasants who collaborated and helped carry out the requisitions.

This is an important point to remember because it is an indication of just how effective propaganda and terror were in convincing people to do terrible things. People were afraid of being deprived of food. They were afraid of the violence. They wanted to save their own families and their own children, so some local people did help the activist brigades carry out the requisitions and carry out the food searches. In effect, the Ukrainian peasantry was divided between those who suffered and those who sought to find ways of surviving themselves.

RFE/RL: Why is the Holodomor such an important chapter in Ukraine's history and such an integral part of Ukrainian national identity?

Applebaum: The Holodomor, because it was repressed and because you were not allowed to speak about it, became part of a kind of underground culture in Ukraine. People spoke about it behind the scenes and passed the story of it from parents to children. The Ukrainian diaspora began to speak about it and write about it and even commemorate it, particularly after they were able to leave the country in large numbers in the 1940s and 1950s. It became a kind of symbol of Ukraine's untold history. It is a way in which Ukraine's history is different from that of Russia, and it is being denied.

In the late 1980s [came the Chernobyl disaster] and immediately afterward many Ukrainians began saying, "Look, this is something that has happened to us before. We had this famine disaster and that was also kept secret." People began speaking again about the famine right at the time when Ukrainian independence became something that was possible again. Although I think there are other reasons why Ukraine sought independence, it was an important motivation for people, a memory of something terrible that had happened and that had been silenced. One of the motivations for people to begin speaking again about Ukraine and Ukrainian sovereignty was to talk once again about the famine.

RFE/RL: You discussed earlier how Ukraine presented a challenge to Stalin. Is there something similar going on now with Russian President Vladimir Putin?

Applebaum: I think that for Putin, Ukraine represents a challenge a little bit the way Ukrainian sovereignty was a challenge for Stalin. Ukrainian independence represents a challenge for Putin as well, particularly a Ukraine which is pro-European, which is democratic, which believes in freedom of speech and the rule of law. These are all ideals... the kinds of values and ideas that threaten Putinism because Putinism is an oligarchic autocracy that would be in trouble if there was complete freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the rule of law.

A Ukraine which embodies European values is a genuine ideological challenge to Putin. I wouldn't say to Russia itself because I think Russia and Ukraine should be close neighbors. If they both shared the same values, they would have valuable exchanges and trade and so on. But Putin's political system does feel challenged by these values and that explains both his attitude toward Ukraine and his invasion of Ukraine.

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Red Famine by Anne Applebaum Review- Did Stalin Deliberately Let Ukraine Starve?

by Sheila Fitzpatrick
The Guardian, 25 August 2017
http://bit.ly/2xJs7LR

The terrible famine of 1932-3 hit all the major Soviet grain-growing regions, but Ukraine worst of all. It was not the result of adverse climatic conditions but a product of government policies. This is, in fact, the case with many famines, as Amartya Sen pointed out in his classic study, *Poverty and Famines* (1981), though the deaths generally occur because of administrative mismanagement and incompetence rather than an intention to murder millions of peasants. The Soviet example is unusual in that Stalin is often accused of having exactly that intention.

The famine followed agricultural collectivisation at the end of the 1920s, a formally voluntary process that was in fact coercive in its implementation. Along with forced-pace industrialisation, it was part of a package of breakthrough modernisation policies launched by Stalin in the first phase of his leadership. Industrial growth needed to be financed by grain exports, which collectivisation was supposed to facilitate through compulsory state procurements and non-negotiable prices. The problem was how to get the grain out of the countryside. The state did not know how much grain the peasants actually had, but suspected (correctly) that much was being hidden. An intense tussle between the state's agents and peasants over grain deliveries ensued.

That is a brief version of the rational account of collectivisation, but there was an irrational side as well. The Soviet leaders had worked themselves and the population into a frenzy of anxiety about imminent attack from foreign capitalist powers. In Soviet Marxist-Leninist thinking, "class enemies" within the Soviet Union were likely to welcome such an invasion; and such class enemies included "kulaks", the most prosperous peasants in the villages. Thus collectivisation went hand in glove with a drive against kulaks, or peasants labelled as such, who were liable to expropriation and deportation into the depths of the USSR. Resistance to collectivisation was understood as "kulak sabotage".

Stalin harped on this theme, particularly as relations with peasants deteriorated and procurement problems intensified. Ukrainian officials, including senior ones, tried to tell him that it was no longer a matter of peasants concealing grain: they actually had none, not even for their own survival through the winter and the spring sowing. But Stalin was sceptical on principle of bureaucrats who came with sob stories to explain their own failure to meet targets and discounted the warnings. Angry and paranoid after his wife killed herself in November 1932, he preferred to see the procurement shortfall as the result of sabotage. So there was no let-up in state pressure through the winter of 1932-3, and peasants fleeing the hungry villages were shut out of the cities. Stalin eased up the pressure in the spring of 1933, but it was too late to avert the famine.

This brings us back to the question of intention. In my 1994 book *Stalin's Peasants*, I argued that what Stalin wanted was not to kill millions (a course with obvious economic disadvantages) but rather to get as much grain out of them as possible – the problem being that nobody knew how much it was possible to get without starving them to death and ruining the next harvest. But that was an argument about the Soviet Union as a whole. If you look at those regions against which Stalin had particular animus, notably Ukraine (with its border location and his paranoia about Polish spies) and the Russian North Caucasus (with its politically suspect Cossack farmers), the picture could be different. Certainly Ukrainians think so. In the version that has become popular since it declared independence, Stalin's murderous impulse was directed specifically against Ukrainians. *Holodomor*, the Ukrainian word for the famine, is understood in contemporary Ukraine not just as a national tragedy but as an act of genocide on the part of the Soviet Union/Russia. As such it has become a staple part of the national myth-making of the new Ukrainian state.

Anne Applebaum's book takes her into this politically contentious territory, and her subtitle, "Stalin's War on Ukraine", may set off some alarm bells. An American journalist who has also worked in Britain (her husband, Radosław Sikorski, served as Polish minister for defence and for foreign affairs, and played a major role in sorting out the Maidan crisis in Ukraine in 2014, and advocated tough sanctions against Russia), Applebaum has been active as a political commentator highly critical of Russia and Putin's regime. Her first book, *Gulag: A History*, won her a Pulitzer prize in 2004 but few friends among western Soviet historians, since she explained in her introduction that, as an undergraduate at Yale in the 1980s, she had decided not to join their ranks once she found out they allegedly had to curry favour with the Soviet authorities to get visas and archival access, a suggestion many saw as a slur on their professional integrity. Her remarks in the same introduction on the world's failure to recognise Soviet atrocities as being on a par with those of Nazi Germany struck an anachronistic note. Currently she is a professor in practice at the LSE's Institute of Global Affairs specialising in 21st century propaganda and disinformation, a subject she knows from both sides, having been involved in the mid-1990s in the Spectator's exposé of Guardian journalist Richard Gott for KGB connections and, in 2014, and having been herself targeted by what she describes as a Russian social media "smear" campaign.

Guardian readers may be inclined to approach a new book on Soviet atrocities by Applebaum warily. But in many ways it is a welcome surprise. Like her *Gulag* – which, if you held your nose through the introduction, turned out to be a good read, reasonably argued and thoroughly researched – *Red Famine* is a superior work of popular history. She still doesn't like western academic Soviet historians much, but at least she mainly avoids gratuitous snideness and cites their work in her bibliography (although my *Stalin's Peasants* is not included, but that is probably an oversight). Whereas in *Gulag* she tended to be grudging about her towering precursor, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whose *Gulag Archipelago* was the pioneering work in the 1970s, in *Red Famine* she is appropriately respectful of Robert Conquest (his *The Harvest of Sorrow* came out in 1986).

Applebaum has, of course, more material at her disposal than Conquest had, including large numbers of Ukrainian famine memoirs. Many of these are published by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, which has an obvious political agenda, but she is by no means offering an uncritical "Ukrainian" account of the famine. Though sympathetic to the sentiments behind it, she ultimately doesn't buy the Ukrainian argument that *Holodomor* was an act of genocide. Her estimate of famine losses in Ukraine – 4.5 million people – reflects current scholarship. Her take on Stalin's intentions comes closer than I would to seeing him as specifically out to kill Ukrainians, but this is a legitimate difference of interpretation. For scholars, the most interesting part of the book will be the two excellent historiographical chapters in which she teases out the political and scholarly impulses tending to minimise the famine in Soviet times ("The Cover-Up") and does the same for post-Soviet Ukrainian exploitation of the issue ("The Holodomor in History and Memory").

The book has one odd quirk, namely its citation practice. As far as I can see, Applebaum has not worked in archives for this book (although she did for *Gulag*). Her footnotes are bulging with archival citations, however, because every time she quotes something from a secondary source that has an archival reference, she gives that as well – and then lists all these archives among the primary sources in her bibliography. This is not normal scholarly practice, though graduate students sometimes do it for effect before they learn better. But given that she was writing a popular history on a topic on which there is an abundance of recently published documents, memoirs and scholarly studies, there was no need for her to do original archival work in order to produce, as she has done, a vivid and informative account of the Ukrainian famine.

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Anne Applebaum Responds to Sheila Fitzpatrick

Facebook, 27 August 2017
http://bit.ly/2ywy0tI

As an author who also writes reviews, I generally try to avoid responding to reviews of my own books. But Sheila Fitzpatrick's review of my new book, Red Famine, in the Guardian on Saturday does contain two extraordinary factual errors which I feel should be corrected, not least because the book is not yet available in the UK, and won't be available in North America for a couple of months.

First, her statement that "Applebaum has not worked in archives for this book" is astonishing: The book is based on hundreds of archival documents, some found by myself and my research assistant, others found by other Ukrainian researchers and published in the huge document collections (these are primary, not secondary sources) that have been compiled in Ukraine over the past decade. In my bibliography, I deliberately included all of the archives that are referred to in all of the footnotes, precisely in order to counter any suggestion - and there have been many such charges in the past - that the voluminous Soviet archival record of the famine is trivial or false.

Secondly, and more importantly, she states that I "ultimately [don't] buy the Ukrainian argument that the Holodomor was an act of genocide." That is exactly the opposite of what I wrote - 180 degrees of difference. My argument is that the famine fits perfectly into the original definition of genocide, as conceived by the legal scholar Raphael Lemkin. Indeed, the central argument of my book, which she does not ever address in her review, is that Stalin intentionally used the famine not only to kill Ukrainians but to destroy the Ukrainian national movement, which he perceived as a threat to Soviet power, and to destroy the idea of Ukraine as an independent nation, forever.

I also explain that, during the United Nations debate about the genocide convention in the 1940s, the Soviet delegation altered the legal definition precisely in order to avoid the

inclusion of the famine, which is why it is difficult to classify the famine as "genocide" under existing international law. Does Fitzpatrick not understand this distinction?

Here are the first two paragraphs of the Red Famine Epilogue, which goes on to explore this entire debate at length:

Those who lived through the Ukrainian famine always described it, once they were allowed to describe it, as an act of state aggression. The peasants who experienced the searches and the blacklists remembered them as a collective assault on themselves and their culture. The Ukrainians who witnessed the arrests and murders of intellectuals, academics, writers and artists remembered them in the same way, as a deliberate attack on their national cultural elite.

The archival record backs up the testimony of the survivors. Neither crop failure nor bad weather caused the famine in Ukraine. Although the chaos of collectivization helped create the conditions that led to famine, the high numbers of deaths in Ukraine between 1932 and 1934, and especially the spike in the spring of 1933, were not caused directly by collectivization either. Starvation was the result, rather, of the forcible removal of food from people's homes; the roadblocks that prevented peasants from seeking work or food; the harsh rules of the blacklists imposed on farms and villages; the restrictions on barter and trade; and the vicious propaganda campaign designed to persuade Ukrainians to watch, unmoved, as their neighbours died of hunger.

Fitzpatrick has other issues as well - she doesn't like my journalism, she doesn't like the introduction I wrote to my previous book, Gulag, (though she mischaracterizes that too) and she seems angry that, more than 20 years ago, I helped the Spectator magazine expose the then-literary editor of the Guardian, Richard Gott, as a paid agent of the KGB. So be it! But in a serious review it is important for basic facts to be correct.

If you want to know more....read the book!

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