The Ukraine List #492

The Ukraine List (UKL) #492
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Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa
www.chairukr.com
www.danyliwseminar.com
13 June 2018

#1
14th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 8-10 November 2018
http://www.danyliwseminar.com

CALL FOR PAPER PROPOSALS
Deadline Reminder: 21 June 2018

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies, with the support of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation, will be holding its 14th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine at the University of Ottawa on 8-10 November 2018. Since 2005, the Danyliw Seminar has provided an annual platform for the presentation of some of the most influential academic research on Ukraine.

The Seminar invites proposals from scholars and doctoral students —in political science, anthropology, sociology, history, law, economics and related disciplines in the social sciences and humanities— on a broad variety of topics falling under thematic clusters, such as those suggested below:

Conflict
•war/violence (combatants, civilians in wartime, DNR/LNR, Maidan)
•security (conflict resolution, Minsk Accords, OSCE, NATO, Crimea)
•nationalism (Ukrainian, Russian, Soviet, historical, far right)

Reform
•economic change (energy, corruption, oligarchies, EU free trade, foreign aid)
•governance (rule of law, elections, regionalism, decentralization)
•media (TV/digital, social media, information warfare, fake news)

Identity
•history/memory (World War II, Holodomor, Soviet period, interwar, imperial)
•language, ethnicity, nation (policies and practices)
•culture and politics (cinema, literature, music, performing arts, popular culture)

Society
•migration (IDPs, refugees, migrant workers, diasporas)
•social problems (reintegration of combatants, protests, welfare, gender, education)
•state/society (citizenship, civil society, collective action/protests, human rights)

****To mark the 85th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Famine (Holodomor), a number of papers/events will be devoted to the Holodomor. Holodomor-related proposals are most welcome****

The Seminar will also be featuring panels devoted to recent/new books touching on Ukraine, as well as the screening of new documentaries followed by a discussion with filmmakers. In 2017, new books by Oleh Havrylyshyn, Yuliya Yurchenko and Mayhill Fowler were featured, as well as the films *The Trial* (by Askold Kurov) and *Alisa in Warland* (by Alisa Kovalenko), with the filmmakers present. Information on the 2016 and 2017 book panels and films can easily be accessed from the top menu of the web site. The 2018 Seminar is welcoming book panel proposals, as well as documentary proposals.

Presentations at the Seminar will be based on research papers (6,000-8,000 words) and will be made available, within hours after the panel discussions, in written and video format on the Seminar website and on social media. The Seminar favors intensive discussion, with relatively short presentations (12 minutes), comments by the moderator and an extensive Q&A with Seminar participants and the larger public.

People interested in presenting at the 2018 Danyliw Seminar are invited to submit a 500 word paper proposal and a 150 word biographical statement, by email attachment, to Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, at darel@uottawa.ca AND chairukr@gmail.com. Please also include your full coordinates (institutional affiliation, preferred postal address, email, phone, and Twitter account [if you have one]). If applicable, indicate your latest publication or, in the case of doctoral or post-doctoral applicants, the year when you entered a doctoral program, the title of your dissertation and year of (expected) completion. Note that a biographical is not a CV, but a written paragraph.

Books published between 2017 and 2019 (as long as near-final proofs are available prior to the Seminar) are eligible for consideration as a book panel proposal. The proposal must include a 500 word abstract of the book, as well as the 150 word bio and full coordinates.

Films produced between 2016 and 2018 are eligible for consideration as a documentary proposal. The proposal must include a 500 word abstract of the film, as well as the 150 word bio, full coordinates, and a secure web link to the film.

In addition to scholars and doctoral students, policy analysts, practitioners from non-governmental and international organizations, journalists, and artists are also welcome to send a proposal.

The proposal deadline is 21 June 2018. The Chair will cover the travel and accommodation expenses of applicants whose proposal is accepted by the Seminar. The proposals will be reviewed by an international selection committee and applicants will be notified in the course of the summer.

To celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Danyliw Seminar in 2014, a special website was created at www.danyliwseminar.com. The site contains the programs, papers, videos of presentations and photographs of the last fourseminars (2014-2017). To access the abstracts, papers and videos of the 2017 presenters, click on "Participants" in the menu and then click on the individual names of participants. The 2017 Program can be accessed at https://www.danyliwseminar.com/program-2017.

Check the "Danyliw Seminar" Facebook page at http://bit.ly/2rssSHk.
For information on the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, go to https://www.chairukr.com. (The site is being re-developed).

The Seminar is made possible by the generous commitment of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation to the pursuit of excellence in the study of contemporary Ukraine.

#2
Ninth International Social Science Summer School in Ukraine

Memories and Legacies of Revolution: Continuity and Disruption, 19th-21st Centuries
Zaporizhzhia, 25-30 June 2018

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa is co-sponsoring the Ninth International Social Science Summer School in Ukraine, to be held in Zaporizhzhia on 25-30 June 2018. An initiative of Anna Colin Lebedev, now Assistant Professor at Université Paris-Ouest Nanterre, the Summer School has been held in different Ukrainian cities since its inception – in Uman (2009), Dnipropetrovsk (2010), Ostroh [Rivne Oblast] (2011), Zhytomyr (2012), Mykolaïv (2013), L'viv (2014), Chernivtsi (2015) and Kharkiv (2016). The School is financially supported by the Danyliw Foundation, the Embassy of France in Ukraine, and the LabEx EHNE of Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

The School is run like an academic workshop, with between doctoral students presenting their research, with a faculty asking as discussant prior to general discussion. Students and faculties are international – from Central, Eastern and Western Europe, and North America. The School is *in* Ukraine, but not exclusively *on* Ukraine, as topics cover the broader area of Central and East European Studies. Students come from a wide gamut of disciplines. In addition to faculty presentations and roundtables, the School features daily academically-oriented excursions, as School participants get to discover a rich corner of Ukraine.

The faculty staff in 2018 is comprised of Anna Colin Lebedev and Ioulia Shukan (U Paris-Ouest Nanterre), François-Xavier Nérard (U Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne), Sophie Lambroschini (Center Marc Bloch, Germany), Mykhailo Minakov (Europa-U Viadrina Frankfurt, Germany), Alissa Klots (European U in Saint-Petersburg, Russia), Mayhill

Fowler (Stetson U, US), Anna Müller (U of Michigan-Dearborn, US), and Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada).

The 2018 Summer School doctoral students:

Olivia Bowins (Brandeis U, US)
Reclaiming the Nation: History, Memory, and Identity in the Estonian National Awakening (1987)

Tetiana Bulakh (U of Indiana, US)
Humanitarian Aid and Citizenship among IDPs in Ukraine

Julie Deschepper (INALCO, France)
The Fate of Soviet Architecture as Heritage in Russia

Magda Dolinska-Rydzek (Justus-Liebig U, Germany)
The Antichrist in Post-Soviet Russia: Transformations of an Ideomyth

Denys Gorbach (Sciences Po, France)
Populist Mobilization and Claim-Making in Post-Maidan Ukraine

Hanna Josticova (U of Birmingham, UK)
Politics of Contention and Identity: The Case of Mariupol

Virginie Lasnier (U of Montreal, Canada)
Demobilization Effects: From the Orange Revolution to the Euromaidan

Natalia Neshevets (U Kyïv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine)
New Sacred Architecture in Kyiv, 1990s-2010s

Natalia Ostrishchenko (Center for Urban History, Ukraine)
"The Same Hands": Urban Experts in Lviv, 1977-2017

Anastasia Papushina (Central European U, Hungary)
Celebrating the Dead in Early Soviet Russia (1917-1924): Instrumentalization of Death, Memory, and History

Hanna Paulouskaya (U of Warsaw, Poland)
The Place of the Classics of Antiquity in Soviet Revolutionary Youth Culture

Timofey Rakov (European U in Saint-Petersburg, Russia)
The Cult of the City: Leningrad as the "City of Revolution"

Maria Rastvovora (Shevchenko National U, Ukraine)
Reality vs Memory: Who Will Take the Place of Lenin?

Anna Whittington (U of Michigan-Ann Arbor, US)
Looking Back, Looking Ahead:
Celebrating the October Revolution under Khrushchev and Brezhnev

Oleg Zhuravlev (U of Tyumen, Russia)
Euromaidan As An Example of Political Positivism

The website of the Summer School can be accessed at https://bit.ly/2y9iUyV.

#3
Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa
Application Deadline: 1 February 2019 (International & Canadian Students)
https://www.chairukr.com/kule-doctoral-scholarships

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, the only research unit outside of Ukraine predominantly devoted to the study of contemporary Ukraine, is announcing a new competition of the Drs. Peter and Doris Kule Doctoral Scholarships on Contemporary Ukraine. The Scholarships will consist of an annual award of $22,000, with all tuition waived, for four years (with the possibility of adding a fifth year).

The Scholarships were made possible by a generous donation of $500,000 by the Kule family, matched by the University of Ottawa. Drs. Peter and Doris Kule, from Edmonton, have endowed several chairs and research centres in Canada, and their exceptional contributions to education, predominantly in Ukrainian Studies, has recently been celebrated in the book Champions of Philanthrophy: Peter and Doris Kule and their Endowments.

Students with a primary interest in contemporary Ukraine applying to, or enrolled in, a doctoral program at the University of Ottawa in political science, sociology and anthropology, or in fields related with the research interests of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, can apply for a Scholarship. The competition is open to international and Canadian students.

The application for the Kule Scholarship must include a 1000 word research proposal, two letters of recommendation (sent separately by the referees), and a CV and be mailed to Dominique Arel, School of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences Building, Room, 7067, University of Ottawa, 120 University St., Ottawa ON K1N 6N5, Canada.
Applications will be considered only after the applicant has completed an application to the relevant doctoral program at the University of Ottawa. Consideration of applications will begin on **1 February 2019** and will continue until the award is announced.

The University of Ottawa is a bilingual university and applicants must have a certain oral and reading command of French. Specific requirements vary across departments.

Students interested in applying for the Scholarships beginning in the academic year 2017-2018 are invited to contact Dominique Arel (darel@uottawa.ca), Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, and visit our web site www.chairukr.com.

#4
New Book

Maciej Olchawa
Mission Ukraine: The 2012-2013 Diplomatic Effort to Secure Ties with Europe
Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2017
https://bit.ly/2l6emjm

On a February night in Kyiv in 2013, former president of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski turned to his friend Pat Cox, the former president of the European Parliament, and joked, "They've got a lot of empty space on this square—an ideal location to put up statues of you and me." Over a year and a half, the two visited Ukraine 27 times, negotiating the release of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, which would allow Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union.

The Cox-Kwaśniewski mission was part of the EU's final effort to save the Agreement and give millions of Ukrainians the hope of a European future. All the while, Russia was using a trade embargo to draw Ukraine into the Eurasian Union. After an intricate game of lies, bluffing and blackmail, Viktor Yanukovych backed out of closer relations with Europe. Feeling betrayed, Ukrainians took to the streets and a wave of civil unrest was born.

#5
New Book

Serge Cipko
Starving Ukraine
The Holodomor and Canada's Response
University of Regina Press
https://bit.ly/2JRlKwZ

From 1932 to 1933, a catastrophic famine, known as the Holodomor ("extermination by hunger"), raged through Ukraine, killing millions of people. Although the Soviet government denied it, news about the tragedy got out and Canadians came to learn about the famine from many, though often contradictory, sources. Through an extensive analysis of newspapers, political speeches, and organized protests, Serge Cipko examines

both the reporting of the famine and the Canadian response to it, highlighting the vital importance of journalism and the power of public demonstrations in shaping government action.

#6
New Book

Maria G. Rewakowicz
Ukraine's Quest for Identity
Embraching Cultural Hybridity in Literary Imagination, 1991-2011
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017
https://bit.ly/2JIGTpS

Ukraine's Quest for Identity: Embracing Cultural Hybridity in Literary Imagination, 1991–2011 is the first study that looks at the literary process in post-independence Ukraine comprehensively and attempts to draw the connection between literary production and identity construction. In its quest for identity Ukraine has followed a path similar to other postcolonial societies, the main characteristics of which include a slow transition, hybridity, and identities negotiated on the center-periphery axis. This monograph concentrates on major works of literature produced during the first two decades of independence and places them against the background of clearly identifiable contexts such as regionalism, gender issues, language politics, social ills, and popular culture. It also shows that Ukrainian literary politics of that period privileges the plurality and hybridity of national and cultural identities. By engaging postcolonial discourse and insisting that literary production is socially instituted, Maria G. Rewakowicz explores the reasons behind the tendency toward cultural hybridity and plural identities in literary imagination. Ukraine's Quest for Identity will appeal to all those keen to study cultural, social and political ramifications of the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and beyond.

#7
Poroshenko will be invited to NATO Summit on July 11-12

by Iryna Somer
Kyiv Post, 8 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2MdIBBh

BRUSSELS — Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has been invited to the July 11-12 NATO Summit in Brussels. And even if Hungary, at odds with Ukraine over the status of the Hungarian language in Ukraine, continues to block meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, there will be talks.

Hungary is obstructing Ukraine's Western integration in a dispute over a language law that mandates that the Ukrainian language is taught in public schools. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban considers the measure discriminatory against the more than 100,000 ethnic Hungarians living mainly in southwestern Ukraine.

So NATO allies will have to talk with Poroshenko outside the format of the commission. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said allies "haven't yet decided the exact formats and the exact types of meeting, but he (Poroshenko) will be invited."

Ukrainian Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak participated in the meeting of NATO defense ministers and countries contributing to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, including Hungarian representatives. While he discussed his concerns over Hungary's obstruction of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, he said they talked mostly about military cooperation.

Poltorak reaffirmed Ukraine's desire to join NATO. "This a strategic task, and we will do everything necessary to become a member. We want it."

But Ukraine is sailing into rougher Western waters. Not only do European politicians, such as Italy's prime minister, want sanctions removed against Russia despite its illegal annexation of the Crimea and war in the eastern Donbas, but U.S. President Donald J. Trump said he wants to see Russia rejoin the Group of Seven nations that expelled the Kremlin over its aggression.

Stoltenberg believes NATO will stay united.

"What we have seen is that there are disagreements related to, for instance, trade, environment, the Iran nuclear deal, but that has not weakened NATO's ability to unite around our core task, to defend and protect each other. Actually, we have seen the opposite. We have seen that NATO has been able to build up and to strengthen our deterrence and our defence and our unity," said Stoltenberg.

The secretary general underlined that the "best thing would be if we were able to solve those differences. But as long as these differences remain unsolved, then my main responsibility is to make sure that NATO is strong and united, despite those differences. And that's exactly what we have managed to do.

Defense ministers at their meeting agreed to bolster the readiness of existing forces in NATO. Allies also committed, by 2020, to have 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels, ready to use within 30 days or less. Ministers also agreed that the new joint force command for the Atlantic will be based at Norfolk, Virginia, in the United States and new enabling command will be based in Ulm, Germany.

#8

IMF Programme Compliance Hurdle Identified in Ukraine's New Court Law

by Roman Olearchyk
Financial Times, 13 June 2018
https://on.ft.com/2sWCyJe

Ukrainian activists have uncovered what they describe as a major shortcoming in an anti-corruption court law adopted last week which threatens to torpedo the war-scarred country's chances of decisively cracking graft and unfreezing a critical $17.5bn IMF assistance package.

The development casts dark clouds over hopes by senior Ukrainian officials that the legislation signed into law by President Petro Poroshenko on Monday was IMF compliant, and that $2bn in fresh funding could be secured by autumn following a summer agreement on raising natural gas tariffs to market levels.

Kiev-based anti-corruption watchdog Antac said amendments snuck into the law in violation of voting procedures envision that appeals of graft cases pursued by a recently formed anti-corruption bureau would be appealed by ordinary appellate judges, "circumventing" the newly formed anti-corruption court.

In a statement, Vitaliy Shabunin, head of Antac's board, wrote: "This provision would mean the amnesty for all top corrupt officials, cases against whom were transferred to the courts. Such a step is a blatant change of previous agreements and the text itself right before the voting."

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn, head of Transparency International Ukraine, said the "mistake should be urgently corrected" with amendments to the law.

There was no immediate comment from the IMF, though it is understood that the issue was a serious IMF programme compliance hurdle which sources close to Ukraine's government, contacted by the Financial Times, expressed deep concern about.

#9

How to Keep the Kremlin and the Oligarchs Out of the Ukrainian White House

By Anders Aslund
Atlantic Council, 11 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2HMGgK2

The other night in Kyiv, one of Ukraine's best political analysts came to see me. He asked me what the United States wants in the next Ukrainian presidential election slated for March 2019. I told him that the United States doesn't have a favorite. Nor will it.

My interlocutor was highly dissatisfied with the answer. But why doesn't the West pick their choice and invest $150-250 million in its candidate as is required to win an election? Both the Russians and the oligarchs do so. Why aren't the Americans rational? Another expert claimed that a popular candidate can win the presidency with only $40-50 million, but that is also big money. By comparison, a Swedish presidential election campaign costs $12 million and a German one $90 million. Those amounts include all the parties.

We went on to discuss Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian oligarch who is considered Putin's foremost agent in Ukraine. He was one of the first people the United States sanctioned over Russia's occupation of Crimea on March 17, 2014, but he thrives in Ukraine in full freedom. He has allegedly just bought three television channels in Ukraine—112, NewsOne, and Zik—in apparent preparation for the presidential election. These channels match a populist electorate. Needless to say, nobody thinks that Medvedchuk has bought these television channels with his own money but has been financed by the Kremlin. Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash still owns the television channel Inter, and we know that he has received his money from Gazprom and Gazprombank.

Next we discussed who stands behind which candidate. A clear pattern can be seen: half a dozen Ukrainian oligarchs are allegedly financing up to eighteen potential presidential candidates. Serious oligarchs have three candidates in the game—one is their favorite, one might win, and one is a spoiler. The picture of a tense game of poker in a smoke-filled room late in the night captures the scene well.

This conversation reflects Ukrainian reality and what is wrong with it. Ideally, Ukraine should carry out three major changes to reduce the danger of its presidential election being purchased outright.

The first goal should be to reduce the president's power by transforming Ukraine into a parliamentary republic. Ukraine's constitution as amended in December 2004 was a hasty patchwork that lacked consistency. The division of power between the president and prime minister was always illogical. With the exception of France, all European Union countries have parliamentary systems, which are more transparent and contain more checks and balances than presidential systems. Ukrainian oligarchs are prepared to put up so much money for a presidential candidate because the expected returns are so great. If the president had less power, the presidential candidates would attract much less financing.

Second, Ukraine can only become a functioning democracy if political campaign expenditures are effectively capped. At present, only someone supported by one of the major tycoons can be elected. The current laws on election financing are too severe so that everybody recognizes that they cannot be applied, and Ukraine does not apply the

rule of law in any case. All European Union countries have imposed strict regulations on campaign finance. In many countries, little but public expenditure is allowed, and these rules have been enforced. The two big campaign costs are television ads and billboards, which Ukrainian non-governmental organizations have measured well for many years. Such limitations can be enforced, if the rule of law even minimally exists. Hopefully, the novel anticorruption court can make a difference.

A much greater problem is the outright purchase of votes. One of my interlocutors claimed that half the Ukrainian electorate votes for money and that a standard payment for one vote is $20. Thus, if fifteen million votes are bought, the cost would be $300 million.

Ultimately, no rules on election financing can be implemented without far-reaching transparency. Ukraine has already advanced far in this direction with all the beneficiary owners of banks having been revealed. The next two steps should be to uncover the actual owners of Ukraine's many television stations and the opening and public audit of election campaigns.

Finally, Ukraine's law enforcement authorities need to impose the country's laws on major Russian agents and sanctioned individuals. They must not be allowed to own television stations and fund presidential election campaigns. How can Medvedchuk and Firtash be allowed in this game? Any receipt of funding from the Kremlin or one of its proxies should disqualify a candidate immediately.

Anders Åslund is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

#10

What is the Price of the Kremlin Aggression in Ukraine?

Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 11 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2LNTcC2

[The Atlantic Council report "Kremlin Aggression in Ukraine: The Price Tag," written by Anders Aslund and cited in this article, is available at https://bit.ly/2t6KhDO --UKL]

The economic aspect of the war in eastern Ukraine and occupation of Crimea is an under-researched topic in the European and North American media, political and expert communities. Neither it is well-researched in Ukraine as the key priority is restoring the state sovereignty over the occupied territories, which pushes the material losses the country has incurred down the list of priorities. In fact, this is no surprise as the issue of reparations is usually brought to the table after the aggressor is defeated and the military conflict is concluded. Apparently, there is still a long way for Ukraine to get there.

At the same time, it is obvious that both Ukraine's direct and indirect losses resulting from Russia's aggression greatly affect the country's economic situation and the social and political developments. In this regard, the intellectual effort to evaluate the economic losses of the past four years is a justifiable and necessary move to understand all other processes in the country.

Nearly the only think tank regularly exploring the topic of Ukraine's losses incurred as a result of the war in the east and the annexation of Crimea is the Eurasia Center. How much has Ukraine lost as a result of the conflict and what can be done were the main questions of the discussion held at Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC) on June 7. The discussion revolved around the research "Kremlin Aggression in Ukraine: The Price Tag" by Anders Åslund published in March 2018. Diplomats, economists, representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the large businesses took part in the discussion. UCMC presents the key findings of the discussion.

Key figures from the Atlantic Council's report. Ukraine's economic losses from Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas constitute at least $100 billion, claims the author of the report. However, this does not include humanitarian, military and political losses incurred as a result of the Russian aggression. Neither does the report include the losses of human capital, payment of the social benefits to internally displaced persons, etc.

The research methodology. Where does the figure come from? Mr. Åslund based his calculations on the methodology suggested by the French economist Thomas Piketty who found out that the overall value of assets in any European country amounts to roughly its annual GDP times four.

By 2014, Crimea and the occupied part of Donbas together accounted for about 14 percent of Ukraine's GDP. Thus, basing the calculations on Ukraine's 2013 GDP of $179 billion, Ukraine's lost assets amount to about $100 billion – with almost $27 billion lost in Crimea and $73 billion lost in Donbas, the analyst claims.
These general calculations are accompanied by the description of Ukraine's biggest losses. According to the expert, the biggest ones in Crimea are the oil and gas resources. They include 18 gas deposits in the Black Sea, the approximate value of which constitutes $40 billion based on the 2014 prices. The losses of the banking system are also relatively easy to assess. Ukraine lost $1,8 billion of the banking assets in Crimea and $4,4 billion in Donbas. Moreover, after the annexation of Crimea Ukraine lost 1,4 billion hectares of land worth over $ 1,8 billion. Russia seized the "Krymenergo" energy company resulting in one more billion US dollar lost for Ukraine. The report by Anders Åslund also comprises the lists of the companies seized by Russia-backed militants in Donbas and by Russia in Crimea.

Legal differences between Crimea and Donbas. There's obviously a difference between the legal status of Crimea and of Donbas, which brings different legal possibilities for

compensation. A large number of claims have been submitted to the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration, they emphasize Russia's violations of the bilateral agreement on the protection of investment. The legal situation in Donbas is more complicated: there is a complete legal chaos as Russia denies its presence.

How does the Ukrainian government calculate the losses? The Ukrainian state has their calculations as to the "price of the aggression." In March 2018, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Dmytro Shymkiv in his presentation on behalf of the Ukrainian authorities quoted the following examples of the economic losses incurred by Ukraine as a result of the Russian aggression. Having lost Crimea Ukraine has also lost 3,6 percent of its GDP; 1,5 percent of its exports; 80 percent of the offshore oil deposits (1,62 trillion cubic meters) in the Black Sea; ten percent of the port infrastructure including four million tons of grain; the possibility for its fleet to sail across the Kerch Strait. Having lost part of Donbas, Ukraine has also lost 15 percent of its GDP; 25 percent of its industry; 23 percent of exports of goods; 100 of the 150 Ukrainian mines are now located in the occupied territory having thus created difficulties with the anthracite coal supplies; $4,3 billion of bank assets, railway assets etc.

Inventory of Ukraine's losses. At the moment all assessments remain preliminary. Participants of the report presentation emphasized that the government of Ukraine has to create the database of the lost assets as soon as possible. Their value needs to be realistically assessed, while all legal possibilities need to be studied to make the Russian Federation compensate these losses.

What can the small and medium-sized enterprises do? Obviously, it is easier for the large businesses to turn to international courts as the court processes require time, financial investment and legal counseling. What can the small and medium-sized enterprises do in this situation? According to Alan Riley, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center, Ukrainian companies, as well as individuals that lost their assets as a result of the Russian aggression, should submit their claims to international courts. It is also worth uniting into groups and filing collective claims in order to decrease the individual share of expenses for court processes. "What we're trying to do here is to encourage individuals and firms to begin to use the international legal system, to go at the Kremlin to seek recompense," said John E. Herbst, Eurasia Center Director, Atlantic Council, former US Ambassador to Ukraine.

The position of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: sovereignty is the priority. On September 30, 2018, expires the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. According to Article 15, Ukraine and Russia have to protect each other's investments. "This is actually the last year when we have to decide the future of our big agreement with Russia concerning the Friendship and Partnership," said Olena Zerkal, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine on European Integration One of the options for settling the investment problem in the temporarily occupied territories is the creation of special state funds that can be used to protect those investors who have lost their assets.

Ukraine will consistently continue to protect the rights of its citizens and legal assets in the temporarily occupied territories. "We are not talking about selling Crimea. Crimea for us is a part of Ukrainian territory. We are talking about the protection of investors who unlawfully lost their rights in Crimea. And we are not talking about the title of ownership in Crimea. This is also obvious for us that the title is in Ukrainian position and Russia has simply usurped our right to regulate and created the double legal regime in Crimea. This is our stable position," emphasized Olena Zerkal. It is though much harder to protect the investors in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to Crimea, as Russia does not recognize its presence in eastern Ukraine. "This kind of damage can be solved afterwards, after the war, as it is usually being done in any conflict, in a conference or agreement," noted Deputy Foreign Minister.

Conclusions. Whether it's $100 billion or $300 billion, it is clear that reparations may become a topical issue only after the war ends, Crimea is returned back and the aggressor is defeated. However, big businesses and medium-sized enterprises that lost their assets as a result of the annexation of Crimea and of the combat actions in Donbas should already be using every legal mechanism available to make Russia recompense the losses. Moreover, exercising pressure upon Russia through international courts may become an additional leverage for any kind of negotiations with the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, there is a completely different kind of losses from the military aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, and these losses are irrevocable – over ten thousand people killed, 25 thousand wounded, 298 passengers of the MH17 flight killed, over 1.7 million IDPs who lost their homes and jobs. How many more are there to come? These are the losses that no amount of money will be able to compensate.

#11

Deaths Set In Stone: Recent Political Assassinations in Ukraine

by Uliana Boychuk
Hromadske, 3 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2LPog4n

The "murder" and subsequent re-appearance of Russian journalist Arkady Babchenko created a shockwave of reactions on various lines. Some were overjoyed and some had praised the SBU for what appeared to be a successful operation. Others highlighted the inappropriate nature of the operation, its damage to journalistic integrity, and questionable success.

Despite this, the "attempted" murder highlighted a particularly tenuous trend of operations taking place in the midst of conflict, dissidence, and political intrigue. As such, the controversy around Babchenko is not the first question of politically-motivated

assassinations. Here we explore five major cases of politically motivated assassinations carried out on Ukrainian soil in recent years.

Case #1: Pavel Sheremet

Pavel Sheremet was a Belarusian journalist and ardent critic of president Lukashenko's government. Having worked for Beloruskaya Delovaya Gazeta and heading the Belarusian Bureau of Russian Public Television, Sheremet spent three months in prison as a result of his criticism. He moved to Russia in 1999 and worked for the ORT state television channel and would continue to work in Russia until 2012 when he moved to Ukraine amidst a tenuous environment for free press in Russia.

On July 20, 2016, Sheremet's car exploded during his commute to work. It was later discovered that two individuals had placed a bomb underneath his automobile. The National Police of Ukraine announced that they would set up an operational group with SBU investigators and FBI involvement.

To this day no leads have been pursued on the investigation and the killers have not been identified. It is also assumed that the bomb may have been planted for Sheremet's co-worker and head to Ukrainska Pravda owner and editor, Olena Prytula.

While the police have not been able to find even base evidence to pursue the case, independent investigators and colleagues of Sheremet's took the liberty of pursuing their own leads, investigating surveillance tapes near Sheremet's house, and analyzing the night before the murder. These leads have found six witnesses and the suspicious presence of the car of a former SBU worker.

Case #2: Amina Okueva

Amina Okueva was a volunteer in Ukraine's east and a representative of the Free Caucasus movement. Born in Odesa, she has been involved in several initiatives and political movements centered around Ukraine and Chechnya. She was married to Adam Osmaev who had been accused of organization an assassination attempt on Vladimir Putin.

She lived in Moscow and found herself in Chechnya when the Second Chechen War erupted in 1999. Since then, she'd returned to Odesa, and later participated in the Euromaidan protests. She participated in the Donbas war as part of the Kyiv-2 Battalion, and served as press secretary for the Dzhokar Dudayev International Peacekeeping Battalion.

Okueva and her husband Adam Osmaev were both shot in an assassination attempt on June 1, 2017. Both had been hospitalized but had survived. The second attempt proved fatal for Okueva after her car was fired upon on October 30, 2017. Osmaev was hospitalized but ultimately survived the second attempt.

Thus far, only one suspect has been found after the first assassination attempt, and he refuses to cooperate with authorities. No leads have been pursued on the fatal assassination of October.

Case #3: Denis Voronenkov

Denis Voronenkov was a former MP in the Russian State Duma, and the only one to have voted against the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. During his time in Russia, he had been involved in several key investigations that uncovered corrupt smuggling operations within the Russian security apparatus. In 2016, he and his wife moved to Ukraine and obtained Ukrainian citizenship. He was considered to be a valuable witness in anti-corruption investigations pertaining to former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych.

On March 23, 2017, Voronenkov was shot dead by an assailant. His bodyguard had also been shot, but not before managing to injure the killer, who later succumbed to his wounds in the hospital. Voronenkov had been planning to meet Ilya Ponomarev, another former Russian MP now living in exile in Ukraine.

The case had been pursued with several clear leads, and two suspects remain in custody. The organizer, Volodymyr Tyurin, was identified alongside two other accomplices, Yuriy Vasilenko, a native of Kharkiv, and Yaroslav Levenets. Each of these is being pursued in separate proceedings and are hiding from the investigation.

Case #4: Timur Makhauri

Timur Makhauri was a Georgian citizen who fought in the Donbas region under the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, largely composed of ethnic Chechens. Makhauri had a particularly complex past with involvement in the Chechen conflict, being an enemy of Ramzan Kadyrov. However, Makhauri is also tied by some to the assassination of Shamil Basayev, an infamous terrorist in the Chechen conflict in Russia.

Makhauri has also been involved in the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, and trained Islamist groups in the Syrian Civil War against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. He was also imprisoned in Turkey on suspicion of killing four representatives of the Caucasus Emirate, an Islamist group operating in Chechnya. He was later acquitted in court and freed.

Makhauri became involved with the Sheikh Mansur Battalion in the war in Donbas, many members of which had combat experience fighting against Bashar al-Assad in Islamist brigades.

Despite this involvement, he had been detained by Ukrainian authorities on January 16, 2017, for illegal firearms possession. Though sentenced, he walked free in February.

Makhauri was assassinated with an explosive device placed in his car, which detonated while Makhauri was driving. The motive of his killing is uncertain, and his friends believe there is some association with agents within Russia, however, no leads nor suspects have been identified in the case.

Case #5: Oles Buzina

Oles Buzina was a controversial Ukrainian journalist known for his ardently pro-Russian views. A writer and former editor-in-chief for the journal "Segodnya", Buzina was harshly criticized for several anti-Ukrainian gestures, including a publication seeking to paint Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko in a negative light, for which he was accused of inciting and proving inter-ethnic hatred. No charges were pressed and he received amnesty as he had an underage child under his custody.

Buzina was shot outside of his home on April 2016. Police found two suspects fleeing the seen upon arrival. As a result of investigation, two suspects, Andriy Medvedko and Denis Polischuk, both belonging to a Ukrainian nationalist group, were detained. The murder charge was later passed to a court where the case is still pending.

His mother stated that she would approach the European Court of Human Rights due to the delays in the investigation.

#12

With Axes And Hammers, Far-Right Vigilantes Destroy Another Romany Camp In Kyiv

by Christopher Miller
RFE/RL, 8 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2xUoAfZ

KYIV -- Swinging axes and sledgehammers as a camera rolled, members of the far-right Azov National Druzhyna militia destroyed a Romany camp in Kyiv's Holosiyivskiy Park on June 7.

The attack marks the second such incident by far-right vigilantes in Kyiv and the fourth in Ukraine in the past six weeks.

The National Druzhyna, a **militia formed in January** by veterans of the far-right Azov Battalion, had visited the camp earlier in the day and spoken threateningly with a woman who lived there, an encounter that was filmed by the group and published on its **Facebook page**.

The militia also issued an ultimatum in the Facebook post for the Roma to clear out within 24 hours or be forced out by a "mob."

"When the police don't act, the National Druzhyna takes control of the situation," the militia wrote.

But the militia didn't wait. Hours later, what appeared to be around two dozen nationalists returned to destroy the camp and harass the few Romany women still there.
The attack was broadcast live on the militia's Facebook page.

That video, which has since been removed, shows the National Druzhyna members in T-shirts adorned with the group's insignia hacking at the camp's makeshift homes with axes and hammers.

A more complete, 12-minute clip of the nationalists' raid was eventually uploaded to YouTube by EuroMaydan, a political group born from the 2013-14 uprising of the same name.

At one point, the militia members mock a woman and child fleeing with their belongings, asking if they planned to eat a nearby dog. "I heard you eat dogs," one of the men says. Later, another belittles a woman trying to collect belongings from the debris by suggesting her actions might be acceptable "in India, but not here."

Near the end of the video, uniformed Ukrainian police officers appear and casually make conversation as the nationalists wind up their raid.

With police looking on, more than a dozen of the vigilantes pose together to a cry of "Glory to the nation! Death to enemies!"

Kyiv police spokeswoman Oksana Blyshchik told **Hromadske TV** the Romany group had already fled the camp when militia members arrived, which the video clearly contradicts. She added that no one had been injured and nobody had been detained.
Late on June 7, Ukraine's National Police said in a **statement** that it had begun criminal proceedings in what it labeled a case of "hooliganism."

"All active participants in this event will be identified and brought to justice," the National Police said.

Right-Wing Immunity?

The Holosiyivskiy camp attack follows three others within the past month and a half.
In May, right-wing thugs attacked a Romany camp in western Ternopil. That followed the burning of one in the nearby village of Rudne in the Lviv region.

In April, members of the right-wing extremist group C14 **chased a group of Roma from their camp** at Lysa Hora nature reserve in Kyiv. Masked attackers hurled stones and sprayed gas as they chased terrified Romany men, women, and children from the makeshift settlement.

Police did nothing until a video of the attack went viral online, forcing them to open an investigation, the results of which remain unclear.

Human rights groups have condemned the attacks and demanded that the authorities investigate them. They say some of the Romany families have been left homeless from the raids.

In its May Nations In Transit report, Freedom House warned of the threat to Ukrainian democracy posed by far-right extremism. "They are a real physical threat to left-wing, feminist, liberal, and LGBT activists, human rights defenders, as well as ethnic and religious minorities," the report said.

Critics accuse Ukraine's current leadership of ignoring the radical and sometimes violent actions of members of nationalist groups with far-right views because of how it might look cracking down on them after many fought to protect the country from Russia-backed forces in the war-torn eastern regions.

Perhaps hinting at a new tack, the National Police statement about the June 7 attack used markedly different language from statements about previous attacks.

"The police will rigorously respond to a violation of the law regardless of which organizations' members are violators," it said. "No one has the right to engage in illegal activities, pseudo ultimatums, or for the sake of PR to conduct demonstrative pogroms against other citizens. In particular, with regard to representatives of ethnic minorities."

#13

Reconciliation Real and Hypothetical: Challenges of Dialogue and Compromise

by Oxana Shevel
Krytyka, June 2018
https://bit.ly/2LIY6QD

The question posed in this *Krytyka* discussion forum – about the possibility and mechanisms of reconciliation between residents of the non-government controlled territories of Donbas and the rest of the Ukrainian society – is undoubtedly a timely and important one. However, the very phrasing of the question – about the reconciliation "after the present Russian aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region ends and Ukrainian citizens who participated on the side of the separatists also lay down their arms

and begin rebuilding their lives" – is setting up a hypothetical reality that may not emerge any time soon, if at all. Furthermore, the feasibility of this reality depends heavily on reconciliation measures Ukrainian government and society can choose to implement now, even before these conditions become real. We thus need to ask two different questions with regard to reconciliation. First, is there anything Ukraine can do now to bring about the reality where "Russian aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region ends" and "Ukrainian citizens who participated on the side of the separatists also lay down their arms" and what is it? Second, if these conditions never occur, what can Ukraine and Ukrainians do now – in the situation of active separatist insurgency in Donbas and Russian support for this insurgency – to foster reconciliation between residents of non-government controlled territories and the rest of Ukraine?

Right now, the possibility that Russia will seize supporting the separatist "republics" in Donbas and separatists will lay down their weapons and return to ordinary life as citizens of Ukraine seems remote. Whatever were the main reasons behind Russia's decision to back up separatist unrest in Donbas, so far Russia has shown no indication of backing down. Putin's main concerns may have been domestic (Ukrainian Euromaidan created a dangerous next door precedent of people overthrowing an authoritarian ruler, which presents a threat to Putin's own authoritarian regime); or he may have been primarily driven by security fears (or, perhaps more accurately, paranoia) about NATO imminently moving to Russia's borders following the Euromaidan victory; or Putin and the Russian elites may be genuinely captivated by the mythology of "one people" and thus found it psychologically unbearable to have Ukraine move away from Russia's socio-cultural orbit. Whatever the reason(s), unless there is some major domestic upheaval within Russia leading to regime change, or until Russia's fears that motivated its support for the "Russian spring" are addressed, it is highly unlikely that Russia will stop backing the self-declared republics in the Donbas standoff.

This leaves Ukraine with two sets of decisions to make. The first is to decide whether it wants to offer some compromises/concessions to Russia in return for it leaning on separatist leaders to agree to be meaningfully re-integrated into Ukraine. Would Ukraine be willing to commit not to join NATO? Would it be willing to reform the constitution to enable regions (read Donbas) to have veto power over certain key policy issues, such as foreign alliances? Would Ukraine agree to implement political measures in the Minsk agreements in ways favored by Russia (for example, elections that would not be fully controlled by Ukrainian authorities and where some Ukrainian parties may not be able to run), with Ukrainian-Russian border control following (rather than preceding) other policy measures? The answer to all of these and similar possibilities by the Ukrainian side seems to be a resounding no. The most recent initiative from the Ukrainian side - a reintegration plan voiced by Ukraine's interior minister Arsen Avakov (https://bit.ly/2H3S933) contains some novel compromise elements, such as a new "law on collaborators" modeled on the post-WWII French law that could excuse collaboration with separatist authorities committed by ordinary citizens who had little choice to survive otherwise. But Avakov's proposal still takes as a starting point a situation whereby following the introduction of an international peace-keeping mission all Russians and

pro-Russian Ukrainian leadership of the pseudo-republics just pack up and leave. This seems highly unlikely to happen without Russia's achieving at least some of its objectives vis-à-vis Ukraine.

The Minsk process remains stalled, even though all sides continue to pay lip service to it, because virtually every political clause in the Minsk agreement (from the timing and sequence of proposed measures to the practical implementation of the agreed-upon measures such as elections, border control, amnesty or "special status") can be realized on terms that would be favorable to one side or the other. And neither Ukraine nor Russia have shown any willingness to back down from their preferred positions so far. The end result is a stalemate that we currently have. Politically, this stalemate may be presented as not the worst outcome for Ukraine (especially given the other alternatives, such as reintegration of Donbas on Russia's terms with possible veto power over central government decisions, or formal recognition of separatist authorities elected on terms favored by Russia), but this "not-so-terrible" political outcome comes hand in hand with continued conflict that is taking enormous toll on those ordinary Ukrainians who are directly affected by it.

Should Ukraine do anything differently? Currently even to suggest that Ukraine, in order to end the conflict in Donbas, may want to consider compromising in order to satisfy Russia's interests seems to be a non-starter for the Ukrainian elites. Any political actor proposing such course of action will be accused of unpatriotic position, treason, or worse. With NATO recently acknowledging Ukraine as an "aspirant" country, a new Ukrainian law on the books adopted in 2017 making NATO integration a foreign policy priority, and recent announcement by President Poroshenko that Ukraine will seek a Membership Action Plan and constitutional amendments to reflect Ukraine's NATO membership aspiration, a compromise on NATO aspirations looks improbable. Yet, with the NATO membership itself not a very likely prospect any time soon if at all, it may be worthwhile to at least have an honest discussion whether compromising on NATO membership might be a very valuable "carrot" Ukraine can play when negotiating over the Donbas settlement. In reality, Ukraine may be compromising very little substantively, but possibly gaining a lot, if Russia were to offer concrete concessions on the Donbas settlement and the Minsk process in return for Ukraine's formal step away from the NATO membership ambition.

If Ukraine is not prepared to make any of the admittedly difficult political compromises in order to settle the Donbas conflict with Russia on terms that would deviate from Ukraine's ultimate preferred position, then it is facing the second set of decisions, and the question we should be asking is what can be done to foster reconciliation between residents of the non-government controlled territories of Donbas and the rest of the Ukrainian society under *current* political circumstances, when Russian backing of the separatist cause is ongoing, self-declared "governments" de facto control the territories and their residents, and a majority of separatist fighters have no intentions of laying down their weapons. Fostering reconciliation under these circumstances will also require some difficult compromises and soul-searching among residents of the "big Ukraine" and the Ukrainian

government. These compromises may, however, stand to benefit Ukraine in the long term as they may be winning hearts and minds in Donbas and thus laying a foundation for a united Ukraine in the future, while in the short run compromise reconciliation measures could foster greater understanding between "big Ukraine" and non-government controlled regions of the "Donbas."

Among measures that may be particularly impactful and important in this regard would be an acknowledgement on the part of the pro-Euromaidan Ukrainians that those Ukrainian citizens in Donbas and elsewhere who did not support Euromaidan and had various fears and grievances against the new government following the fall of Yanukovych have the right to have their voice heard in the post-Euromaidan public discourse. This does not mean that "big Ukraine" has to suddenly accept the misguided notion that Euromaidan was a far-right coup, or that the new government is a "fascist junta," or that the new regime has been bent on discriminating Donbas and the Russian speakers. Rather, it means that in "big Ukraine" there has to be a public space for an open and honest discussion about issues such as the role of the far right during and after the Euromaidan; or the recognition and further conversation about the fact that the Donbas rebellion was not simply a Russia-manufactured conflict but an event that had complex causes, including local roots, participants, and grievances.

At this point, some may object that these types of acknowledgments would only serve to legitimize the Russian narrative of the conflict, but it's not the case. One-sided narratives that conveniently omit facts that do not support the narrative are easily undermined in the age of open access to information, and with that stand little chance of winning over those who *a priori* reject this narrative because of their prior beliefs and/or personal experiences. Can we seriously expect that, by casting residents of Donbas who did not side with the post-Euromaidan government either as Russia's agents or as puppets brainwashed by Russian propaganda, a divide between Ukrainians on the two sides of the "contact line" can be breached? This is no less futile than to insist, as many in Russia do, that pro-Euromaidan Ukrainians have been brainwashed by Western actors and powers and would turn to Russia if only Western patrons and the "junta" they installed in Kyiv would let them. Embracing as legitimate the complexity of attitudes Ukrainians, including Ukrainians in Donbas, hold about the cause and consequences of dramatic events in Ukraine's recent history is not a solution *per se* but a method that, by fostering the culture of compromise, negotiation, and open discussion, could make reconciliation more likely. The terms of such a reconciliation would be set by society rather than mandated by the government, but a democratic government should welcome rather than fear this possibility.

A truth commission modeled on the examples from elsewhere could be a practical measure that would support the environment of open discussion where a variety of views can be expressed without individual repercussions or group stigmatization, eventually fostering a society-led reconciliation. Truth commissions have been created in more than 30 countries that have experienced conflict and massive human rights violations. Established to determine the facts, causes, and societal consequences of past human

rights violations, truth commissions are a recognized reconciliation tool that helps societies to rebuild trust among citizens. In the Ukrainian context, the ongoing conflict poses a problem for a "classic" truth commission model that is generally set up after the conflict ends, but much of the work that these commissions do can begin before the conflict has ended, and Ukraine could choose to do so – starting, for example, by focusing on the conflict period experiences of liberated territories of the Donbas. If an independent truth commission were to be created, preferably with international involvement, to gather evidence and individual testimonies about violations of rights committed during the course of the Donbas conflict by actors on all sides, this could help foster reconciliation and subsequent societal integration. The independence of such a commission is key, otherwise, it can easily fall under suspicion of being one-sided. The idea that not only separatists but some members of pro-Ukrainian forces are also be guilty of human rights abuses and civilian victimization in Donbas, as international monitoring reports have shown (see Note) is not popular in Ukraine. But denial and lack of punishment of pro-Ukrainian perpetrators will not serve to build trust across the "contact line" divide, or foster loyalties to the Ukrainian state in the liberated territories. At the same time, it would admittedly be a very difficult choice for "big Ukraine" to prosecute and condemn its own rights violators in a situation of ongoing conflict and when the other side will not be engaging in a similar *mea culpa*.

Ultimately, however, meaningful and lasting reconciliation would require difficult compromises on all sides – be it by the residents of "big Ukraine" or by the residents of the non-government controlled Donbas. Since at present "big Ukraine" can only control its own choices, it is up to "big Ukraine" to decide whether to start an open but difficult dialogue that would break taboos about what constitutes a legitimate opinion or position to express. Creating public space for such a dialogue is something Ukraine has the power to do in the conditions of the continued Russian aggression and Russia's support for the anti-Kyiv insurgency in Donbas. An inter-Ukraine dialogue by itself is not going to end Russian involvement in the Donbas conflict, but it can contribute towards reconciliation between "pro-Maidan" and "anti-Maidan" Ukrainians not only in Donbas but across the country. And as Ukrainians do the hard work of domestic bridge-building, Ukraine may also strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia which would find it more difficult to claim that rabid nationalism is the Ukrainian government's ideology. Perhaps then Ukraine will take the initiative and offer some creative compromise to Russia, with Western powers acting as guarantors of this political settlement. And then the *Krytyka*-specified condition will finally be fulfilled - "the present Russian aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region ends and Ukrainian citizens who participated on the side of the separatists also lay down their arms and begin rebuilding their lives."

Note: Human rights monitoring organizations such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Human Rights Watch have documented in their periodic reports evidence of all sides in the armed conflict in Donbas committing acts violating international human rights law, and possibly amounting to war crimes. For example, OHCNR "Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 16 November 2017-

15 February 2018" (https://bit.ly/2sPRKrJ); Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Failing Its Human Rights Commitments," 18 January 2018 (https://bit.ly/2rciVv9).

#14
The Orthodox Churches and the 'Church War' in Ukraine

by Chris Linderhof, Chris
Raamop Rusland, June 2018
https://bit.ly/2sXgMnS

[For citations and sources, go to the web version –UKL]

This essay looks at the relations between Ukraine's two biggest Orthodox churches, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP).

Since the start of the war in Donbas the UOC MP has come into trouble. The UOC MP was the preferred church of the Yanukovych regime and is big in almost the whole country. The variety of opinions within the church, but also the messages emanating from the 'Motherchurch' in Moscow, make it vulnerable.

The UOC KP has stricken a different tone right from the start, supported the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 and the Ukrainian Army in the East gaining in stature and parishioners, but so far the number of defections of parishes and parishioners from the MP to the KP seems rather restricted. In 2018, the MP remains the biggest church in Ukraine and a force to reckon with.

Ukrainian independence and the origins of the Church conflict

Ukraine has four main nationally recognized Orthodox Churches: the UOC MP, the UOC KP, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). Conflicts exist between all these churches, but due to a lack of space I will focus on the conflict between the two biggest ones: the MP and the KP.

In 1991 Ukraine gained independence. The political establishment of the new state soon realized that an independent state also needed an independent church. Its most logical basis would be the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which was the only allowed Orthodox Church during the last decades of Soviet rule and over half of its 7000 parishes were located in Ukraine, mostly in the Western, former 'Uniate' territories.

In 1990, after the death of Patriach Pimen of the ROC, Metropolitan Filaret, his right hand, was expected to become the new Patriarch. The vote turned out differently though. His bishops rebelled against him and in May 1992 Filaret was deposed. He then created his

own church: the UOC KP. Since 1995, after another merger and split there exist four main Orthodox churches in Ukraine. The relations between them have been tense, because all churches accuse each other of 'stealing' whole Church buildings, parishes and even bishops.

Canonicity

One of the main factors in the current conflict is canonicity, the principle that the church is established according to the Orthodox canons, and is recognized as such by the other mostly national Orthodox Churches. The only church that receives international recognition as Orthodox Church in Ukraine is the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), which is, as said, still subordinate to the Moscow Patriarch.

The UOC KP has sought official recognition for its Autocephaly from their establishment in 1992 and often had the government on its side. Since Moscow categorically does not want to grant Autocephaly to any Ukrainian Church, the only way to gain it was to request it from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople, which sees itself as the Motherchurch of all Orthodox Churches. Ukrainian Presidents Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) both asked Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeus to grant canonical status to the Kyiv Patriarchate.

Especially the celebration of 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus' in 2008 was a chance for Yushchenko to gain this Autocephaly from Constantinople, but the attempt failed allegedly due to the insistence of Filaret (KP) that only he could be the Patriarch of a united Church. The Ecumenical Patriarch has consequently stated that first the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches should unite amongst themselves and only then the issue of canonicity can be fully addressed.

It must be said that the Moscow Patriarchate uses its own canonicity as its major trump-card, depicting the other Orthodox Churches as heretics who should show repentance and return to the fold of the (Moscow) Motherchurch. The fact that it obtained this canonicity by bribing the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1686 is conveniently ignored.

Personalities of Filaret and Onufriy

Also of importance in the standoff between the Orthodox Churches are the personalities of the leaders of the MP and KP, Metropolitan Onufriy and Patriarch Filaret respectively.

Onufriy is born in the Western province of Bukovyna and was known for his staunch pro-Russian positions which he demonstrated in the Kharkiv Sobor in 1992 when the now Patriarch of the KP Filaret tried to obtain Autocephaly and Onufriy voted against. He became the locum tenens of the MP in February 2014 because of the ailing health of Metropolitan Volodymyr and had by then already turned to pro-Ukrainian positions.

Filaret, on the other hand, is born in Eastern Ukraine, in Donetsk oblast. He was the exarch of the ROC in different countries in the sixties, seventies and eighties and in 1990 the main pretender to take Patriarch Pimen's place. After this failed, Filaret, who had all his life supported the Russification of the ROC in Ukraine, made a U-turn to pro-Ukrainian positions and established his own church, the UOC KP.

Since Onufriy is one of the bishops who prevented Filaret from becoming the all-Russian Patriarch, it is clear that there is enmity between the two leaders. This is an extra complicating factor in the process of unification of the churches.

Stances of the KP and MP on the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas
With the Euromaidan in November 2013 a new period of political turmoil started in Ukraine, which after the Russian intervention in Crimea in Spring 2014 even turned into a war.

The KP, with its more nationally oriented leadership and parishioners immediately took the side of the protesters in November 2013, opening even the Mikhaylivskyi monastery as a makeshift hospital.

The MP found itself in an awkward position. It had openly supported Ukrainian president Yanukovych (2010-2014) in the preceding years and had benefited from that. During the Euromaidan the MP did not officially take sides though several MP clerics appeared on Maidan, calling mostly for a peaceful solution. On the other hand other MP clerics harshly criticized Euromaidan and even a 'crusade' (*khresna khoda*) against it was organized.

After Yanukovych had fled the MP denounced him and held him responsible for the crisis in Ukraine. When Russia invaded Crimea, the MP did formally respond. Metropolitan Onufriy wrote a letter to Patriarch Kirill asking him to persuade Putin to withdraw his troops. In his response Kirill assured that 'the Ukrainian people must determine their own future without external influence'.

At the same time Kirill refrained from attending the annexation ceremony of Crimea by Putin's Russia in March 2014 and up to date Crimea is still not accepted as canonical territory by the ROC, leaving it in the jurisdiction to the UOC MP.

The silence of Kirill leaves room for other, far more outspoken propagators of the 'Russkiy mir', such as Vsevolod Chaplin, in 2014 spokesperson of the ROC, who even managed to call the invaders 'peacemakers'. The obvious support for the invasion among the ranks of the ROC made the situation for the UOC MP even more peculiar. Being considered 'traitors' by large parts of the Ukrainian population, many MP clerics actually held pro-Ukrainian positions themselves. Since then, Onufriy and the UOC MP are continuously performing a balancing act between the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian factions within their own church, with a fair amount of parishes located in areas that are now occupied. The MP is collecting money and materials for displaced people and has also recently started to prepare chaplains for the Ukrainian Army, although the KP and Ukrainian

nationalists claim that it would be detrimental to national security to allow MP chaplains into the barracks.

Is the Moscow Patriarchate losing ground in Ukraine?

There are several ways to answer this question. Since there are no statistics on the numbers of parishioners attending masses, we will look at which church Ukrainians prefer and also at the numbers of parishes each Patriarchate. I chose to use the 2017 inquiry on Ukrainians' religious views conducted by Razumkov Center, since this is one of the most respected analytical centers in Ukraine and their research covered a broad range of questions concerning religious life.

On the question 'To which Orthodox Church do you belong?' picture 1 [see web version –UKL] shows that the KP turned out to be the biggest Orthodox Church in 2017, gaining 26,5% of the total allegiance, with the MP collecting a meager 12%. There is a clear trend with rising support for the KP and falling support for the MP, visible already before the war, but it seems the war has speeded up this process. The number of parishioners of the UAOC has been stable at around 1%, while the percentage of people not declaring themselves members of any denomination fluctuates between 39 and 21%.

Regionally, the developments are also interesting: while in the Western macro-region the number of adherents of the KP has not changed significantly (from 29 to 31%, but with a peak of 36% in 2016), in the Central region the number of KP adherents almost doubled from 20 to 36,5% (and more than doubled if you take into consideration the situation before the war, when the KP gathered 17% adherence). In the South and East a more stable picture arises, with the KP roughly constant at 13/14% in the South and even losing a bit in the East in 2017 compared to 2014 (14 vs 17%).

The Moscow Patriarchate is losing nominal adherence in all four macro-regions. In the West they go from almost 20% in 2014 to 12% in 2017, which is still pretty solid if you consider that in Galicia the MP is virtually non-existent, and a higher percentage than in the Center and East(!). In the Center, South and East the MP also declines in the 2014-17 period: from 16 to 11%, 22 to 15% and 21 to 12% respectively.

All in all, it's important to note that the number of persons not denoting affiliation with any of the Orthodox Churches remains very high with still 24% in 2017 in Ukraine overall and 32% in the South, where it is higher than the KP and MP combined. This could mean that a lot of parishioners simply do not know to which Patriarchate the Church they attend belongs to, that they prefer not get involved in Church politics in any way, or that parishioners who disattach themselves from the MP do not automatically go over to another denomination.

The figures for Church allegiance taking into account only those who declared themselves Orthodox in picture 2 confirm the results found above. The KP clearly outpaces the MP

in the West and Center and has overhauled the MP in the South and East, but the high percentage of undecided "Simply Orthodox" makes these figures relatively unreliable.

Apart from statistics on Church allegiance, we should also look at the numbers of parishes, churches, monasteries etc. Here the Moscow Patriarchate still vastly outperforms the Kyiv Patriarchate. According to statistics of the MP itself the number of parishes in 2017 grew from 12017 to 12069. The Kyiv Patriarchate did not release any statistical information about 2017 yet, but according to the State Committee on Religious Affairs it had 5114 registered parishes at the start of 2017, of which 4790 were active. Therefore, we can conclude that the Moscow Patriarchate is still by far the biggest Orthodox Church in number of parishes, while the war did indeed effect the image of the MP in general.

How does this play out on the ground? There has been a flow of MP parishes defecting to the KP, of which the Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU) devised a convenient map, complete with information on each case (picture 3). The orange dots depict parishes that fully switched their allegiance from the MP to the KP, while the red dots indicate parishes where conflicts arose, usually because the parish split into two and one of the two denominations did not want to allow the other one into the Church building any more. The MP accuses the KP of holding 'illegal referendums', while the KP accuses the MP of not handing over the church buildings to the parishes which have switched allegiance to the KP. What strikes most is that 'the Church front' is mostly confined to Western Ukraine, more precisely to what used to be Southern Volhynia, modern day north Ternopil oblast and south Rivne oblast.

There is a second, much smaller, 'front' on the border of Galicia and Bukovyna, that is of modern day Ivano-Frankivsk and Chernivtsi oblasts. What makes it painful for Metropolitan Onufriy though is that allegedly his native village Korytne is among the parishes where a conflict about whether to go over to the KP is going on.

By contrast, in the East and South the number of switches has remained very low, with only two cases in each macro-region. In one village in Kherson oblast the parish switched allegiance after ten villagers joined the Ukrainian Army to fight in Donbas. Both in the East and South the switches were not accompanied by conflicts. In the Center, finally, only Cherkasy oblast stands out with five defections.

As causes for switching allegiance the parishioners mostly mention the war instigated by Russia, the fact that the highly unpopular Patriarch Kirill is often still celebrated in masses and sometimes the fact that the priest refused to participate in funerals of fallen Ukrainian soldiers. In a few cases high prices for rituals such as funerals or drunkenness of the priests caused the parishioners to search for a different Patriarchate.

Whether or not the MP can contain the flow of parishes exiting the church remains to be seen. The bulk of the switches occurred in 2014 and 2015 though, therefore the situation seems to have stabilized more or less already. The aforementioned Razumkov statistics

showing a small increase in the number of parishioners of the MP in the Western provinces, from 10,5% in 2016 to 12,1% in 2017, also hint in that direction.

The main threats for the MP nowadays are probably the patriotic though oligarchic media and the radical nationalistic organizations. In the media there is regular coverage of the misdoings of the MP, for instance of their love of fancy cars and expensive watches, but also on how several MP clerics support the separatists, do not want to condemn the Russian aggression or even take up arms against Ukraine themselves, etc. Some of these media even give 'advice' on how to fight the MP (by using financial means). The radical nationalists take more decisive action, sometimes blocking the Pecherska Lavra, and most probably also breaking into church buildings, stealing the money collected, destroying church inventory and occasionally committing even arson.

The MP is not only with the KP in conflict over parishes, but also with for instance the UGCC over several churches, but the number of conflicts with the other denominations is far smaller.

Conclusions

Since the start of the Euromaidan Revolution and the following war with Russia the old 'Church wars' of the 1990's have gained new momentum. In the 1990's the conflict took place between all denominations, nowadays it is mainly between the MP and the other Orthodox confessions, especially the KP. Although sociological inquiries suggest that the MP is losing support and that the KP has more support in all four macro-regions of Ukraine, the situation on the ground with the number of parishes suggests something else. The number of parishes of the MP still more than doubles the number of KP parishes. It is of course questionable in how far all these parishes are actually active and to what extent they show real allegiance to their respective Patriarchates, but the fact that most of the 70 defections took place in a relatively small area in Southern Volhynia points out that the positions of the MP are still quite strong, even in Western Ukraine. The leadership of the MP will continue to balance between the different factions within the church itself and between the positions of the Motherchurch in Moscow and nationally Ukrainian oriented parishes. If the MP manages to hold this balance the church will remain a religious and political force to reckon with.

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#15
Honest History: Volyn Tragedy

Polish, Ukrainian Ethnic Cleansing Still Used as Political Tool
Kyiv Post, 8 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2JxxDoy

Every now and then Oleksandra Vaseiko, 72, walks alone to the forest glade near her village of Sokil, in Volyn Oblast, 500 kilometers west of Kyiv but close to the Ukrainian-Polish border.

There, the woman hangs a clean rushnyk — a traditional Ukrainian embroidered towel — on an iron cross. It marks the site where about 400 Poles were killed and buried.

They had been residents of the nearby Polish village of Ostrivky, and were killed in August 1943 by soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and some local villagers. Some residents of Sokil, including Vaseiko's father, had helped some Poles escape death. Others looted their empty houses.

Just two months later, armed Poles attacked Sokil and a nearby village Polapy, killing dozens of Ukrainians there and burning many houses.

It was retaliation for the killing of the Poles, according to residents of Sokil and Polapy. At the same time, some locals say the initial attack by Ukrainians was itself vengeance for previous killings by the Poles.

It was one of the incidents of what is now known as the Volyn Tragedy — a series of mutual mass killings of thousands of Poles and Ukrainians in 1943. It is the most bitter episode in the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations, and likely the least studied one.

It is surrounded by myths and is widely used by politicians in Ukraine, Poland and also Russia to stir tensions between their peoples.

"War is war, but we should learn how to forgive," Vaseiko, known locally as Grandma Shura, told the Kyiv Post. "But it's still too hard for our people to start forgiving."

Bloody 1943

Atrocities of war came to this quiet forested area on Aug. 28, 1943, when a group of soldiers from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army arrived on horseback in Polapy, located next to Sokil, to take part in celebrations of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin, an important Orthodox Christian holiday.

At this point in the World War II, this area was still occupied by the Nazis, although the liberation of Ukraine has already started in the east.

In the morning after the celebration, the Ukrainian insurgents attacked the Polish villages of Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska, according to Polapy's school history teacher Nadiya Malias, who learned about it from locals.

There was a young woman among the Ukrainian soldiers who claimed the Poles had earlier killed her entire family somewhere near Volodymyr Volynsky, a town some 60 kilometers to the south.

The Ukrainians killed most of the Polish residents of Volia Ostrovetska on the spot. But when they went for the nearby Polish village Ostrivky, Nazi German soldiers shot at them.

So instead of killing the villagers on the spot, they dragged them out of the village to the forest and executed them there, according to Witold Szablowski, a Polish journalist who spoke to some Polish survivors. More than 1,000 Poles were killed in that raid. The glade where the residents of Ostrivky were killed and buried is still called the Corpses' Field by locals.

Vengeance came in two months.

Armed Poles arrived in Polapy on Oct. 14, 1943, another big Orthodox religious holiday. They killed at least 48 Ukrainians, and burned down part of the village, including its old wooden church. Then they went to the smaller village of Sokil and killed those who were unable to run away, Malias said.

Residents and historians disagree on who these armed Poles were — the Polish Home Army resistance group, the Farmers' Battalion Polish guerilla movement, or some other group.

Olga Silchuk, 77, a resident of Sokil, was just three years old at that time. She says she remembers hiding in the forest with her family, after the Poles burned down her house. Her grandfather, unable to escape, was burned alive there.

The two friends, Silchuk and Vaseiko can't agree which side, Ukrainian or Polish, started the killings.

"Hate raged then. Each side was killing the other," Vaseiko said.

Warnings

Silchuk said some of her family's neighbors had been warned by friendly Poles to run away before the attack on Sokil started.

After the attack on Ostrivky, Vaseiko's father brought food to a Polish family of three who were hiding in the forest from the Ukrainian insurgents. The family didn't survive: later he found them murdered, and buried the bodies in the forest.

After the war, he brought his daughter to the place and cut crosses onto the three trees, under which he had buried the Poles, asking her not to forget what had happened there. Vaseiko showed that site to Polish historians who were exhuming Polish mass graves in the area in the early 2000s.

One of the historians was Leon Popek, whose grandfather, aunt and two cousins were killed in Ostrivky. But Popek's grandmother escaped a massacre in another Polish village, Hai, thanks to a Ukrainian man who hid her.

Szablowski described these stories in a book about Ukrainians who had saved Poles during the incidents of ethnic cleansing, "Righteous Traitors. Neighbors from Volyn" (2016).

He believes the topic could be a path to reconciliation between the two nations.
"I thought this was the way we could start talking to each other," he said.

Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka in his book "From the Volyn Massacre to the Operation Vistula. Polish-Ukrainian conflict" (2011) also wrote that more than 1,800 Poles had been saved by Ukrainians from being massacred in Volyn.

Why Volyn?

In the early 20th century the historic Volyn area, which is now part of the modern Ukrainian Volyn and Rivne oblasts, and northern part of Ternopil Oblast, passed from Russian imperial control to the Ukrainian National Republic. Then in 1921 it became part of the Second Polish Republic, where it was called the Volhynian Voivodeship.
It was a multiethnic area, inhabited by Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Czechs, Germans and other nationalities.

But Ukrainians living in the Second Polish Republic felt like second-class citizens.
The Polish authorities attempted to assimilate them, closing down Ukrainian schools and Orthodox churches. The authorities also allocated the best farmland in the area to osadniks — settlers, who were veterans of the Polish Army or Polish civilians.

As a result, both the Soviets, who came to Volyn in 1939, and the Nazis, who replaced them in 1941, were at first hailed as liberators. But it soon became clear that both had brought even more repression to the locals.

Still smarting from the bitter loss of their independent state after the war in 1918–1919, Ukrainians were gradually shifting their support to radical nationalists. The Organization

of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in its more radical branch under Stepan Bandera, and its military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), were quickly gaining new recruits.

In 1943, when it was clear the Nazis would soon be in full retreat, thousands of Ukrainians left the German auxiliary police and joined the Ukrainian insurgents. The German authorities then in many cases replaced the Ukrainians in their auxiliary forces with Poles.

The woodland of Volyn region was an ideal place for the guerrilla war that the Ukrainian insurgents waged against the Nazi authorities, the Soviet partisans and local Poles, with the goal of establishing an independent Ukrainian state. But the unarmed Poles were the easiest target.

Historians disagree over who started the violence — the Ukrainians or the Poles. But a set of simultaneous attacks on Polish villages by members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the summer of 1943 indicates that the violence had been organized at the central command level, according to Ukrainian historian Georgiy Kasianov.

“Although nobody has ever found a written order by (head of Ukrainian Insurgents Army in Volyn Dmytro) Kliachkivsky or anyone else, such coordination shows the attacks were planned,” he said. “They had the aim of ‘cleaning’ the area of Poles.”

Since the killings were committed not only with the bullets but also with the axes and pitchforks, some Ukrainian villagers evidently participated in the ethnic cleansing as well, Kasianov added.

Historians say Kliachkivsky and Roman Shukhevych, the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, were responsible for planning the attacks, Kasianov said.

On July 11–12 alone, Ukrainian insurgents attacked about 100 Polish villages. July 11 is now a day of commemoration in Poland for the victims of the massacres.

The attacks prompted the Poles to self-organize and ally either with the German authorities or the Soviet partisans to get arms for self-defense. The Polish Home Army started retaliatory attacks against Ukrainian villages, though these attacks were of a much smaller scale than those launched by the Ukrainian side.

How many killed?

The number of alleged victims of the massacres vary drastically due to lack of research, and myths that hundreds of thousands of Poles and tens of thousands of Ukrainians were killed have sprung up.

Polish historian Motyka estimates that 40,000 to 60,000 Poles and 2,000 to 3,000 Ukrainians were killed in Volyn during the clashes.

However, Ukrainian Kasianov believes that a more accurate estimate of the number of Poles killed in Volyn is close to some 35,000. He says that most of the original estimates were based on the memories of survivors, and when the first exhumation work started, the number of victims was revised downward.

The exhumations of the victims, which started in the early 1990s, have later been blocked for bureaucratic reasons.

Szablowski knows of about 2,000 of victims' burial sites in Volyn, only a few have been checked so far. This prevents the number of victims from being established accurately, and denies thousands of murdered people a dignified burial.

"For me, this is the most painful aspect of the Volyn Tragedy," Szablowski said.

War of memories

The Volyn massacres have become a grizzly subject of political campaigns, with the occasional acts of vandalism of both Polish and Ukrainian monuments to the dead.

In April 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that bans displays of disrespect to fighters for Ukraine's independence, and that includes fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

In turn, in July 2016, Poland's lower house of parliament the Sejm passed a resolution declaring the killings of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists during World War II an act of genocide. Ukraine noted this move with "regret," President Petro Poroshenko said at the time.

The mutual ill feeling between Ukraine and Poland has been further stoked by Russian propaganda. The Russian-backed separatists that control the Ukrainian eastern city of Donetsk since 2014 hold annual commemoration events for the Polish victims of the Volyn massacres. They also occasionally host pro-Russian Polish politicians.

The Polish security services recently said they had uncovered a pro-Russian group that had sought to fuel tensions between Poland and Ukraine by "undermining interpretation of Polish history and replacing it with a Russian narration."

"There is no any other topic that could make us fight each other, apart from the Volyn massacres, and (Russian President Vladimir) Putin knows well how to use it," Szablowski said.

Top myths about the Volyn massacres

Myth 1: Ukrainians and Poles never collaborated with the Nazis

Fact: Ukrainians living in Volyn first welcomed the coming of the German Nazis, seeing them as liberators from Soviet and Polish repression and a way to achieve an independent Ukrainian state. But the life in the Nazis' Reichskommissariat Ukraine, which included Volyn, was even more brutal, and snuffed out those illusions. In 1943, thousands of Ukrainian men left the German auxiliary police and joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to fight against the Nazis. They were replaced by thousands of Poles, who often allied with the Germans to defend themselves from Ukrainian insurgents.

Myth 2: Hundreds of thousands were killed in Volyn

Fact: Exhumation work at the mass graves of the victims of the massacres show that tens of thousands of Poles and several thousand Ukrainians were killed in the Volyn massacres. The inflated numbers of victims are widely used by politicians but have never been confirmed by historians.

Myth 3: All Ukrainians were against Poles and all Poles were against Ukrainians

Fact: Ukrainians and Poles had lived in Volyn for centuries side by side, becoming friends and relatives. Historians indicate thousands of cases of civilians saving people of both groups saving each other from ethnic cleansing. Many refused to abandon spouses or parents who belonged to another ethnic group, and were persecuted for this by nationalists.

Myth 4: All Ukrainian guerilla fighters took part in killing Poles

Fact: Historians have proof that mass killings of Poles were conducted by soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, though some leaders of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (such as Mykola Lebed) didn't approve of the killings. Taras Bulba-Borovets, the leader of the Ukrainian armed units that were also operating in Volyn, condemned the killings of Poles and banned them, but some of his soldiers disobeyed his orders.

Myth 5: The Volyn massacres were a Polish-Ukrainian war

Fact: The killing of unarmed civilians by the guerrilla fighters was a case of ethnic cleansing rather than war. Although some Polish villagers managed to organize defenses against attacks by Ukrainian nationalists, this was not common. Polish guerillas also committed ethnic cleansing of Ukrainian villages, but on a much smaller scale, and only sporadically.

Ethnic change in Volyn region

The ethnic attacks that started in Volyn in 1943 then spread to eastern Halychyna and parts of modern Poland, adding to the number of victims on both the Polish and Ukrainian sides. Motyka estimates that up to 100,000 Poles and 15,000 Ukrainian civilians were killed from 1943 to 1947.

The ethnic violence led to a population exchange between the Soviet Ukraine and socialist Poland in 1943–1947, and then to Operation Vistula in 1947– the forced resettlement of Ukrainians from the southeastern provinces of Poland to the west of Ukraine.

The dreams of Ukrainian nationalists to make Volyn ethnically homogenous had come true, but due to the Soviets' ethnic cleansing efforts.

According to a population census conducted in 1921, only 68 percent of the population of Volyn were Ukrainians, almost 17 percent were Poles, almost 11 percent were Jews, almost 2 percent were Czechs and nearly the same number were Germans. But in 2001, Ukrainians composed almost 97 percent of the population of Volyn Oblast and almost 96 percent of Rivne Oblast.

Olga Silchuk, 87, from Sokil still remembers the pre-war multinational Volyn where "all were like relatives and lived in friendship."

She can also recall how that world was destroyed during World War II.

Silchuk remembers the taste of chocolate given to her by a German soldier, and how she had stepped over some Russian-speaking fighters who were sleeping soundly in her family's house. She remembers how she brought her mother's food to a group of Jews hiding from Nazis. She remembers her grandfather being burned alive in the house by vengeful Poles and her father being killed by the Soviet authorities, who thought he was a Ukrainian guerilla fighter.

"One evil led to another," she said.

#16

Alisa Kovalenko on How Her Doc Home Games Went from Idea to Short to Feature

British Council, 31 May 2018
https://bit.ly/2l6HZ3X

The Ukrainian director, whose project was developed through The Guardian Goes Ukraine, with our support, took the feature-length version to Sheffield Doc/Fest 2018 for its world premiere.

Home Games is the result of a long journey which began in the Soviet past of my country, Ukraine, and also in my personal and family history. Few people know that in 1974, under the Soviet Union led by Brezhnev, the authorities banned women from playing football on the pretext that it was bad for their health! In Ukraine, it was not until perestroika that the first women's football club was founded, in the medium-sized town of Chernihiv, in 1987, the year I was born.

When I was little, my cousin Ira was a footballer in our home town, Zaporizhia. In 1991, she was one of the last Ukrainian women to play in the USSR national team. After that, life played tricks on her. The Ukrainian economy deteriorated, the country was plunged into poverty and the infrastructure of women's football collapsed. All the heroines of my childhood – these beautiful, strong, courageous girls whom I went to see playing on Sundays – had to reinvent their lives in adversity. My cousin made a new life for herself in Poland. She's in her 40s now.

Nobody in Ukraine knows that girls play football. There are about 200 professionals: no sponsors, no money, no television, no salaries. Most of them come from disadvantaged backgrounds and continue to survive in poverty. When I finished my previous film, I felt it was vital to find a present-day Ira. Find one of these young girls and film her life.

In February 2016, I went to film a training session with Atex Kiev, the only professional women's football team in Kiev and the poorest in Ukraine. The coach, Alla, told me, "If you want to make a movie, look at that little girl over there, she's got gold in her feet and an incredible personality but her life is a disaster." It was Alina, whose life I then shared.

Alina was 20 when we met. She was one of the greatest hopes of national women's football. Her family was in ruins – during her adolescence her mother and father were in prison so she lived in an orphanage with her grandmother. She has a brother and a sister aged five and six. I started filming Alina's life, and then suddenly, after a few weeks of shooting, her mother died at the age of 39. Alina was still so young but she abruptly had to make her first steps into adult life. Will she give up football to save her family? Can she fight for her dreams when all the odds are stacked against her?

Very quickly I had to sort out my film and that's when I met my British partners. At the end of March 2016, the excellent Ukrainian documentary festival Docudays UA organised The Guardian Goes Ukraine, supported by the British Council, which gave Ukrainian filmmakers the chance to pitch to the Guardian. My project touched the jury, and in particular Charlie Philips who is in charge of documentaries at the Guardian. He gave me an award as well as financial support to make a short film about Alina's life. However, I wanted to make a feature film, so I worked on both versions.

My producer Stephane Siohan is a French journalist and documentary maker who lives and works in Kiev. We started the project with his production company, East Roads Films. Soon we partnered with my friends Maxym and Valentyn Vasyanovych,

from Studio Garmata Film. Valentyn is one of the best Ukrainian directors of the moment. He produced *The Tribe,* which won an award at the Cannes Film Festival in 2014, and also *Black Level*. For me, Maxym and Valentyn represent the excellence of new independent Ukrainian cinema: demanding, radical, without compromise.

The Guardian supported us during the beginning of the process and in 2017 we produced a short version of *Home Games*, with a very specific narrative adapted for an online audience. The feature film is very different: it focuses on the long term and has a more elaborate cinematographic narrative. It was very enriching, but also a challenge, to work on these two versions. I shared this adventure with two people whom I admire and respect very much: the cameraman Stefan Sergeï Stetsenko, who filmed Sergeï Loznitsa's documentary *Maidan*, and the editor Olha Zhurba.

For many months I filmed Alina and her family every day, capturing her life as a footballer and her new life at home rebuilding her family. We developed a personal relationship and I hope the film reflects this intimacy. At the same time we developed relationships with several international organisations. We were supported and funded by the IDFA Bertha Fund in Amsterdam and the Ukrainian State Film Agency, which has greatly expanded its support for documentary in the last three years.

We were able to present our film in progress at the Odesa International Film Festival in Ukraine, at the East Doc Platform in Prague, and at the Baltic Sea Forum for Documentaries in Riga, Latvia. All these meetings helped to boost the project in terms of production and give us the means and partners to bring it to life. In recent months, we have been joined by Telewizja Polska, the Polish public broadcaster, and the innovative Russian-language channel Current Time TV, based in Prague.

I don't want to say too much about *Home Games*, I prefer to let people find out as they watch it, but I will say that it is a sad film full of light and hope. Our team refers to it as "the dented fairy tale". It's important to me because it's a film about the little people. My generation started its revolution in 2014 to change our country and make it a better place to live. For that, we pay a high price because our neighbour has decided to inflict a war on us. It is no coincidence that the first political prisoner to be arrested, Oleg Sentsov, is a film director, because directors are dreamers and it is they who help change life.

We have much to tell Europeans about the struggle of our generation. Our country doesn't change as fast as we would like, because it is run by those who forget that there are little people. People like my heroine, Alina, who don't go to war, but whose daily life is a war, a fight for survival. These people are forgotten in our society, I want to give them the light they deserve. I want my cinema to be social, realistic, but also poetic. I would like to show that there is always hope, even when the light seems to have gone out.

Home Games is a very Ukrainian film about girls playing football, but it also describes the state of our society. I think it's also a very universal film, which could be set in South America, the French suburbs, or even England. I'm very proud that Sheffield Doc/

Fest chose our film, not just because England is a football land and Ken Loach's country, but also because Sheffield shares an industrial heritage with Ukraine. My hometown, Zaporizhia, is a kind of Ukrainian Sheffield! I'm sure my film can strike a chord with the English and tell them about the other side of Europe.

Sheffield Doc/Fest will probably be a turning point in Alina's life. She's at a key moment. I'm not going to reveal the end of the movie, but things change – for the better. There have been fundamental movements around women's football in Ukraine and the beginning of interest from sponsors and media players. There is real social challenge in a country that is still very patriarchal – women are having their say and I hope that mentalities are changing.

I'm now preparing a new film on a completely different subject, but I also decided to extend my adventure in women's football. I am currently finishing a documentary series of ten episodes of 26 minutes each. This series, produced by East Roads Films and broadcast by Current Time TV, explores other facets of women's football in Ukraine. With a team of Ukrainian film professionals, I went to meet women who play football all round Ukraine: in the Donbass at war, in the port of Mariupol, in the Carpathian mountains. It is a beautiful project that shows what it is like to be a woman in Ukraine today.

#17
Q&A with Alisa Kovalenko, Alisa in Warland

Danyliw Seminar, November 2017
https://bit.ly/2JTRUYL

The 2017 Danyliw Seminar featured a screening of the Ukrainian film *Alisa in Warland* (2016), which depicts the journey of a 26-year old film student in Kyïv, Alisa Kovalenko, to the frontlines of the Donbas war as she embedded herself in a *Pravyi Sektor*. The film is of the intimate genre, with the camera increasingly on Kovalenko, depicting the tension between her dual role of filmmaker and citizen in a war zone, and the strain with her partner and journalist Stéphane Siohan, increasingly worried about the danger she was exposing herself to.

The screening of Alisa in Warland was followed by a Q&A with the filmmaker Alisa Kovalenko. An edited transcript was prepared by Michelle Betbadal.

Question: What did you think of yourself in relation to Ukraine and these events, and even before these events?

Alisa Kovalenko: When the revolution started, I was still a student at a film school. I first started as a journalism student, but found more interest in filming documentaries, as being a filmmaker provided me with the ability to spend more time with characters and to

look deeper into the events of the time. I am from Eastern Ukraine, but it is clear through this personal film, that I felt the need to stand against the separatist movement. The war was so close to the territory where I am from, which meant to me that it was also my war. I felt obliged to film this important document. It was important to film what happened.

Where are you now [in your personal life, under strain in the film]?

While I spent time with Pravyi Sektor [she was embedded with a Pravyi Sektor battalion during a significant part of the film –Ed.], I had no idea what would happen afterwards—especially in terms of my relationship with Stéphane [Siohan, a French journalist based in Kyïv, who was also attending the Danyliw Seminar -Ed.]. Today, Stéphane and I are still partners, and have a six month-old baby.

How did you decide to go with those soldiers (Pravyi Sektor) in particular?

I did not want to go with Pravyi Sektor originally, I wanted to go with volunteers. I was on the frontline for the first time. I was a little bit afraid—afraid to see radicalism. But I did not end up seeing radicalism. It is important to understand that the party and military wings [of Pravyi Sektor] are very different. The Ukrainian army was in a bad state at the time. The soldiers kept saying that I am a journalist, but it is funny because they noticed that I never asked anyone any question. I thought it was very important to spend as much time as I could with them. I had no authorization. I was a student at the time, and I asked the university to send a letter, but they declined. I received accreditation when I finished the film. Usually you know where you can and cannot film (in military zones), however I did not get this information.

At times you are filming yourself and at other times your friends are filming you. Could explain why this is?

My film reflects two projects into one. One is my personal story, and the other is my story being filmed by others. At first, my friend filmed me, but as the film carried on, I began to film myself.

Could you tell us more about these people (Pravyi Sektor)?

One of them was Jewish, another a businessman, many were students—one actually went back to pass an exam and then came back to fight. There was a professor, one a commander from [a military] school, as well many young boys.

So the Right Sector and the regular army were different but sometimes worked together?

I thought it was important to go with them because I wanted to make a film about four guys, but they decided not to go to the front, so I ended up going with this group.

From your point of view, where is the limit in the film? Where did you stop being a filmmaker and become a soldier?

I never became a soldier. There was only one time I shot that gun, because the soldier wanted me to shoot a gun with him [For practice, not in live combat –Ed.]. I cannot be coldhearted when there is a war in mycountry. I got to see incredible human relationships—you are between life and death and everybody can show their inner human nature. The moments when I was happy was when I was with the soldiers. Being in a war is very easy—you fight, you laugh—everything is black and white—there is a sort of illusion about the world.

Question to Stéphane Siohan: What is your vision of the film and of her during these months and how did you convince her to choose you over [staying with] the Right Sector?

Stéphane Siohan: It was not easy to film for us. It was both a film and a story. When I met her, she was still in university. She knew that she was one of the emerging filmmakers. I had to trust her—she was not just a student going to film the revolution, she was a documentary maker already. I could not precent her from going to the war. I was supposed to stay one week, but I ended up staying three months. Who was I to prevent her? She is not a child, and it is her country. I decided to trust her completely, one hundred percent. I was in a very difficult position because working as a reporter in Eastern Ukraine, I knew what was at stake, and I knew the limits of journalists, and how to keep myself out of danger. As a journalist, you fight to stay alive, but as a filmmaker, you have to stay with the people you are filming—this is the difference between the two. It is difficult to find the limit between giving her freedom and trying to protect her.

Today, there is a lot of disappointment with what has been achieved, how do you and your colleagues of yours and the soldiers feel about the situation, are you patient? Are you hopeful? Disappointed?

Alisa Kovalenko: There are no spirits like there were when the war started. There was a spirit in Maidan, we all went with a spirit, and now it is not there anymore. We know we have problems to solve, and we felt we had to do something—we didn't just want to fight.

Could you explain the title (reference to Alice in Wonderland)?
We were in the editing room, and I recalled that one soldier said to me: "you are in a war zone.". My editor said that this would be a working title, but it just ended up as the title.

What is it like for you to see the film now?

I am not a journalist anymore. It is painful to watch some parts of the film—I cannot watch it. I went outside [during the screening] to smoke a cigarette. But I still think the film is important... painful...traumatic—you understand what human relationship is like during war.

What made you stop going to the war zone?

When the guys who I filmed stopped fighting. The last time was in March 2015. Afterwards, no men were fighting there... I wanted to go and meet them there, but they decided that it was finished.

Did you try to shoot on the separatist side?

It was impossible for me to film in Donetsk. Honestly, you can be captured there, you become afraid. After captivity you cannot go back. I wanted to and tried to contact them, but it was very dangerous for me. It was impossible to go to the separatist side, even with the desire to go there.

Do you think that the soldiers you were filming even helped to stop the war? Did they accomplish the task at hand?

It was not my task to analyze it. I am not a journalist. I started the film with my point of view. I was not making a TV documentary, I was not there to validate anything.

Do you think you are offering something helpful as a citizen?

When we went to war, I didn't feel like it was the solution, and I didn't ask them. What could we do except for war? I did not necessarily support those who fought. I asked myself, what could I do? I could provide food, or I could witness it, or I could provide medical aid.

Stéphane Siohan: I don't believe filmmakers should take a civic position. Journalists work in that way. It helped as a journalist to have deep insight, off and on record, with this film. It helped greatly to understand what the war was about. I refused to report on Pravyi Sektor. When she was finished, I then chose to go there.

Did you come across any foreign fighters?

Alisa Kovalenko: Yes, they were form Georgia, Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Canada, and France.

Where did the supplies come from and from whom?
It was very complicated with the guards. The army gave shells to Pravyi Sektor. Food—it was different, it was complicated with the food. One would go seek for it—we'd have corn and fish, and made borscht with fish—it was disgusting!

How do you feel now? You say you are a different Alisa now... how?

I think I already answered this question before. I am more of a pessimist now. I would make it completely different film if I went to war again. I had emotion and hope. It is

not the same for the guys who participated. One cannot always be at such a high level of emotions or we will become crazy. I didn't become a soldier because I did not feel like it.

What is the project you are working on now?

Alisa: I am working on a social drama about a young girl; one of the best football players in Ukraine. Her mother died at the onset of the film. She has siblings, a younger sister and brother. It is hard to choose between saving the family and football. I have been filming her for almost three years now.

#18

Kira Muratova, Renowned Ukrainian Director, Dies at 83

by Nick Holdsworth
Hollywood Reporter, 6 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2MqlgfV

Her fame transcended the Soviet era, and her works influenced a new generation of Russian and Ukrainian filmmakers.

Kira Muratova, one of the Russian-speaking world's most influential filmmakers, has died. She was 83.

Muratova died in Odessa, Ukraine, where she had lived and worked for many years, her husband, Yevgeny Golubenko, told the Ukrainian news portal Buro. Friends on social media said she had been ill for some time.

A director and screenwriter, Muratova earned plaudits at home and abroad for her fearless work, which included critically acclaimed features such as The Asthenic Syndrome, a dark satire of Soviet society revolving around a student with acute melancholia. It received a special jury prize at the 1990 Berlin Film Festival.
Writing on his Facebook page, producer Yura Minzianoff recalled screenings at Moscow's famous VGIK film school of one of her early films, Dolgie Provody (Long Farewells). It was made in 1971 but not honored at Russia's domestic Oscars, the NIKA Awards, until 1988.

"With Kira's passing," he wrote, "an entire epoch ends. I remember how her students cried over Long Farewells."

Born in a part of Soviet Bessarabia that is now Moldavia, Muratova graduated from VGIK in 1959 and went on to work with some of the Soviet Union's most noteworthy actors and entertainers, including Vladimir Vysotsky, theater director Oleg Tabakov and actress, director and screenwriter Renata Litvinova.

Her last film, *Eternal Homecoming* — a love triangle about old school friends who run into each another and find they share a love for the same woman — screened at the Rome Film Festival in 2012.

Muratova's international honors included the American Cinema Foundation's Freedom Award in 2000, an honorary Golden Leopard from the Locarno festival in 1994 and Golden Lilies from Germany's goEast Festival in 2001 for *Second Class Citizens* and in 2005 for *The Tuner*.

"Kira Muratova was probably not so popular with the Russian public, but film critics and people who love and know cinema consider her an outstanding director and author," Russian distributor and sales agent Raisa Fomina told *The Hollywood Reporter.* "She was a rare example of honesty, artistic independence and dedication to her profession for all her life in cinema. She did not make many films during her life, and she had to overcome so many obstacles, which the state and censorship created. But if you saw her films, you will never forget them."

#19
Filmmaker Leonid Kanter Commits Suicide

by Yuliana Romanyshyn
Kyiv Post, 5 June 2018
https://bit.ly/2xPAyHw

Leonid Kanter, a noted Ukrainian filmmaker, committed suicide on June 4, the Kyiv Post has confirmed.

Kanter shot himself in the village of Obyrok, Chernihiv Oblast. Chernihiv police published a report about the suicide of a man without naming him. Police spokesperson Yaroslav Trakalo later confirmed to the Kyiv Post that the man was indeed Kanter.
Police found a weapon next to the body: Kanter shot himself in the head, and left a suicide note, police said.

Kanter, a father of three, was one of the founders of the Obyrok art-village, having moved there from Kyiv in 2007. He was an organizer of art and culture festivals, including Mother Africa and Bread — a festival in which participants gathered to make homemade bread.

After Russia launched its war on Ukraine in the Donbas in 2014, Kanter directed two documentaries about Ukrainian soldiers serving in the east. One documentary, "The Ukrainians," tells the story of the volunteer soldiers who defended Donetsk Airport from in 2014 and 2015. The airport was captured by Russian-led forces in early 2015.

His last documentary, co-directed with Ivan Yasniy and entitled “Myth,” was about the Ukrainian soldier Vasyl Slipak, who gave up his career as an opera singer with the Paris Opera to serve in the Ukrainian army.

Kanter collected archive videos of Slipak, visited his home town and his relatives, and traced his steps in the Donbas. Kanter later went on tour with the movie, presenting it in a dozen cities in Europe and North America.

UKL 492, 13 June 2018

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